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of 
Euratom Safeguards 
1991  liB  1992 
(presented by the Commission) EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
1.  It  is  recalled  that following  the  nuclear  affairs  in  1988  the  Council's 
Atomic  Questions  Group  had  requested  that  the  Commission  should 
prepare a detailed report on Euratom Safeguards. 
2.  The European Parliament in resolution of 6 July 1988 published in the 
O.J.  No.  C235/70  of 12-09-1988  "calls  on  the  Euratom  Safeguards 
Directorate to submit a comprehensive annual report to the parliament 
which would be available to the public". 
3.  Consequently the Commission presented a first comprehensive report 
(SEC {90}. 452) final with particular reference to 1988. 
4.  During  the  discussions  in  the  Council  and  in  response  to  questions 
from  the  Parliament  the  Commission  reconfirmed  its  intention  to 
prepare such an operations report on a biennial basis. 
5.  Consequently,  the  Commission  presented  a second  report  (SEC  {92} 
80 final) which covered the period from 1989 - 1990. 
6.  The aim is now to provide a comprehensive survey for the period 1991 
-1992. Report  on the Operation of  EURATOM Safeguards 
1991 and 1992 
Table of  Contents 
I.  Introduction  ......................................................................... 1 
Scope of this report 
Safeguards 
Legal Bases 
Means 
II.  Safegtiards operation  ................•...........•..  ~ ....................... 5 
Number of  installations and Material Balance Areas 
Stocks of  nuclear material 
Safeguards approaches and implementation 
- Introductory remarks 
- Non quantifiable Verification aspects 
- Survey of Verification techniques 
- Inspection effort 
-Findings 
Ill.  Accountancy ..............................  ~ ........................................ 28 
General 
f1ccounting System 
External obligations 
Transit accounting 
IV.  Resources ...........................................................................  32 
Inspection manpower resources 
Inspection manpower resources until 1995 
Operational credits 
Instruments, methods and techniques 
Informatics 
Support from the Joint Research Centre 
V.  Relations with the International Atomic Energy Agency  .............. 45 
VI.  Illicit trade and transfers of  Nuclear Materials  ............................ 48 
VII.  Cooperation with CIS and PECO States  .................................... 50 
VIII.  Trends in safeguards ............................................................ 54 
IX.  Summary .......................................  ,. .................................... 57 
ANNEXES 
Annexe 1 - Glossary 
Annexe 2  - Chapter VII of the EURATOM Treaty Chapter I 
- 1 -
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Scope of this report 
1.  In its Report (SEC{92}80) final, after this referred to as  the "1990 Report" 
the  Commission presented tho second comprehensive report with particular 
reference to 1989 and  1990 on the operations of EURATOM safeguards and 
tho Commission invited tho Council and tho European Parliament to note its 
content. 
2.  During  the  discussions  in  the  Council  and  in  response  to  questions  from 
Parliament  the  Commission  reconfirmed  its  intention  to  prepare  such  an 
operations report biennially. 
3.  The aim of the present third report covering  1991  and  1992 is to provide a 
comprehensive survey on the operation of EURATOM safeguards in the civil 
nuclear  fuel  cycle  including  research  and  other  related  activities  of  the 
European  Community.  The  survey  includes  the  safeguards  findings  with 
particular  reference  to  1991  and  199  2,  the  issues  under  discussion  or 
consultation  with operators  or  under  consultation  with  national. authorities 
and  with the International  Atomic  Energy  Agency  (IAEA).  The  survey also 
includes  a  report  on  the  illicit trade  of nuclear materials,  a  survey on  the 
cooperation  with  CIS  and  PECO  states  in  safeguards,  a  survey ·on  the 
available  resources  and  an  indication  of  the  trends  in  and  challenges  to 
safeguards during the years to como. 
4.  The report is addressed to the Council and  to the European Parliament, who 
are invited to note its contents. 
Safeguards 
5.  It  may  be  recalled  that  the  word  safeguards,  in  the  framework  of  the 
EURATOM  Treaty,  means  the  set  of  measures  performed  to  enable  the 
Commission  to  satisfy  itself that  nuclear  material  is  not diverted  from  its 
intended  and  declared  uses  (particularly  to  unlawful  non-peaceful 
applications)  (Article  77all  and  that  obligations  arising  from  International 
Agreements  including  those  with  the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency 
(IAEA)  concluded  by  the  Community  (Article  77b))  are  complied  with. 
Examples of the latter undertakings are  (besides peaceful pledge)  restrictions 
on  re-transfers  outside  the  Community,  certain  controls  on  heavy  water, 
equipment  and  tritium· and,  notably,  the  three  safeguards  agreements 
concluded with the IAEA in the framework of the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 
Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Chapter I 
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6.  Safeguards are  not concerned with nuclear safety nor with tho protection of 
people and of the environment from tho hazards of ionising rodiation nor with 
physical  protection. Nuclear safety relates to tho safe design and  operation 
of nuclear facilities. Radiation protection controls rolato to health and safety, 
environmental protection, snfe handling procedures for nuclear materials etc. 
Physical protection relates to the security measures taken to protect material 
from  theft  or  other  misuses.  Safeguards  may  take  advantage  of  such 
measures in designing verificntion schemes but they are, in themselves, .quito· 
independent. Whereas physical protection is  mninly the responsibility of tho 
Member  States,  the  Commission  is  responsible  for  the  application  of 
safegunrds pursuant to Chapter VII of the Treaty. 
7.  Chnpter VII  of the Treaty provides  for safeguards  to bo  applied  to all  civil 
nuclear  materials  stored,  used  or  transported  within  tho  Community.  Tho 
activities involved include therefore the main fuel cycle activities of uranium 
mining,  conversion,  enrichment,  fabrication,  power  reactor  operation, 
reprocessing  and  waste  storage  and  disposal  as  far  as  ores,  source  or 
special  fissile  materials  aro  concerned.  Also  included  aro  tho  full  range  of 
other activities that use source or special fissile materials, viz.: Research and 
development,  laboratories,  service  activities  for  the  nuclear  industry  (e.g., 
analytical laboratories), research reactors and the use of nuclear materials in 
non-nuclear activities. 
8.  The  EURATOM Treaty provides for the application of safeguards to all .civil 
nuclear material as  a basic function of Community law, establishing to this 
end a direct relation between tho Commission and operators; Member States 
are  also  associated  in  the  application  of EURATOM  Safeguards  within  the 
limi(s  set  out  by  the  Treaty  and  its  implementing  Regulation.  The  NPT 
provides  for  the  npplication  of  snfeguards  by the  IAEA  in tho  non-nuclear 
weapon  Stntes  of  the  Community;  IAEA  snfegunrds  also  npply  in  nuclear 
weapon  States  following  "voluntary  offers"  by  those  States.  These  IAEA 
safeguards are  exclusively aimed  at ensuring,  as  appropriate, non explosive 
or  peaceful  use  of  safeguarded  material  and  apply  world-wide  on  n 
contractual  basis,  through  safeguards  agreements  and  entailing  a  direct 
relation only between the  IAEA  and  its Member States.  In the  Community, 
the  Safeguards  Agreements  concluded  by  EURATOM,  tho  Member  States 
and the IAEA ensure the necessary coordinntion between the two safeguards 
systems. 
legnl bases 
9.  The  obligations  and  responsibilities  of  the  Commission  of  tho  European 
Communities in  the  field  of safeguards  are  set  out in  Articles  77  to  85  of 
Chapter VII of the EURATOM Treaty. 
It is European law. Chapter I 
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10.  The provisions of Articles 77 to 85 of the Treaty specify: 
Art. 77:  In essence, the Commission shall satisfy itself that the nuclear 
materials are  not diverted from their intended uses as declared 
by the users and that the provisions relating to supply and any 
particular safeguarding obligations assumed by the Community 
under an  agreement concluded with third countries or with an 
international organisation (e.g., the International Atomic Energy 
Agency  (IAEA))  are  complied  with.  Pursuant  to  this  article, 
EURATOM  Safeguards  also  monitor,  and  report  on,  the 
application of Chapter VI of tho Treaty. 
Art. 78:  Tho  declaration  by  operators  of  the  basic  technical 
characteristics  of  tho  installations  as  well  as  the  need  for 
Commission approval of techniques to be  used for the chemical 
processing of irradiated materials. 
Art. 79:  Requirements  on  operators  to  maintain  a  system  of  nuclear 
materials  accounting,  including  recording  and  reporting. 
Obligation on  tho Commission to promulgate a Regulation; 
Art. 80:  Deposit of excess special fissile materials not in use; 
Art. 81 :  Inspections; right of access; procedures in case of opposition; 
Art. 82:  Recruitment  of  inspectors.  Follow-up  procedures  involving 
Member States in case of infringement; 
Art. 83:  Sanctions in case  of infringements by operators; 
It  may  be  mentioned  in  this  context  that  the  Commission 
imposed  in  1992  a  sanction  on  a  Community  undertaking 
following an infringement. 
Art. 84:  Scope  of safeguards  and  exclusion  for  materials  intended  to 
meet defence requirements; 
·Art. 85:  Adaptation  by  the  Council  of  the  procedures  for  applying 
safeguards. 
11.  Commission  Regulation  (EURATOM)  No  3227/76  of  19.1 0.1976  (O.J.E.C. 
No  L363  of  31.12.1976)  as  amended  by  Commission  Regulation 
(EURATOM)  No  220/90  of  26.01.1990  (O.J.E.C.  L22  of  27.01.90)  and 
Commission  Regulation  (EURATOM)  No  2130/93  (O.J.E.C.  L191/75  of 
31.07.93), specifies  general  obligations  on  operators  with  respect  to the 
provision  of  basic  technical  characteristics,  recording,  reporting,  advance 
notification  of  transfers.  The  regulation  also  specifies  the  requirement  to 
adopt Particular Safeguards Provisions (PSP)  for each installation. Chapter I 
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12.  Tho Community has concluded agreements in the nuclear field with tho U.S., 
Canada  and  Australia.  To  verify  that  the  undertakings  included  in  those 
agreements  are  carried  out, tho  Commission  acting  through  its  EURATOM 
Safeguards Directorate tracks relevant  material under specific safeguarding 
obligations, each identified by an appropriate code ("flag"). 
13.  The Community has concluded three Safeguards Agreements with the IAEA 
based  on model agreement INFCIRC/153, but including a protocol regulating 
the interface between the EURATOM and JAEA safeguards' systems: 
13.A.  Agrooment11  between  the  Community,  its  Non-Nuclear  Weapon 
States (NNWS) and the IAEA; 
13.8.  Agreemont21  between tho Community, the United Kingdom (UK)  and 
the IAEA; 
13.C.  Agreement3l  between the Community, France and the IAEA. 
Means 
14.  In  order  to fulfil  the  mandate  of Article  77 of the Treaty, tho  Commission 
has, since  1958, deployed a corps of EURATOM safeguards inspectors. The 
funds are provided through budget chapter 84.2. 
15.  In  accordance  with  the  legal  prov1s1ons  referred  to  above  the  EURATOM 
safeguards  inspectors  of  the  Safeguards  Directorate  DG  XVII-E  ("DCS") 
perform  inspections  in  the  nuclear  installations  and  perform  related 
headquarters accountancy evaluation and follow-up. 
I 
1  6.  Inspections and  accountancy supported by appropriate logistics are the main 
pillars  of EURATOM safeguards;  no adequate verification can be  carried  out 
unless these operate effectively. 
1) Published in IAEA document INFCIRC/193 
2) Published in IA[A document INFCIRC/263 
3) Published in IAEA document INFCIRC/290 Chapter II 
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/1.  SAFEGUARDS  OPERA T/ON 
Number of Installations. Material Balpnce Arcps (MBAsl and stocks of nuclepr 
material 
17.  In  the  "1990  Report"  the  Commission  presented  the  number  of  Material 
Balance  Arens  (MBAsJ  under  Euratom  safeguards  separately  from  the 
number  of  Locations  Outside  Facilities  (l0FsJ1>,  Carriers,  Intermediaries 
etc  ..  so  as  to enhance  transparency,  i.e.  to separate  the  installations with 
largo  (equal  to or  more than one  effective kg.2lJ  inventory or throughput of 
nuclear  material  from  those  46%  (end  1992)  of  all  installations  under 
safeguards  where  less  than  2%  of  the  cumulative  inspection  effort  was 
spent due to their tiny quantities of nuclear material. 
Table II. 1.1. presents the number of material  balance  areas  (MBA)  and the 
number of large installations under Euratom safeguards. It may be  noted that 
an MBA is tho basic safeguards entity i.e. an  area  such that a)  each transfer 
into  or  out  of it and  b)  the  physical  inventory  of  nuclear  material  can  be 
determined. 
Table  II. 1.2.  !)resents  the  number  of  installations  of typos  LOFs,  Carriers, 
intermediaries etc. including those  "installations" which are, for purposes of 
IAEA safeguards, combined into 1 accounting and  reporting  unit referred to 
as CAM (see Glossary attached). 
18.  The  above  tables  II. 1. 1.  and  11.1.2.  give  also  the  summary  of  the  MBAs 
under  JAEA  routine  inspection.  MBAs  under  IAEA  safeguards  in  NWS  are 
inspected by the IAEA if designated to this effect by the latter, pursuant to 
the provisions of the Agreements JNFCIRC/263 and INFCIRC/290. 
19.  Among the MBAs listed in table 11.1.1.  there are  60 MBAs, located in France 
and the United Kingdom, referred to as  "mixed" MBAs. At these MBAs, civil 
and  non-civil  material  are  handled,  processed  or  stored  together  either 
simultaneously or sequentially. 
1>  Locations outside facilities (LOF) are MBAs holding less than 1 effective kilogram but 
more than the upper limit for CAM facilities (see Glossary attached). 
2)  For the definition of an effective kilogram cf.  Regulation 3227/76, quoted under 
paragraph 11  above, article 36 (o). Type  Install-
ations 
B 
Research laboratories  57  4 
Mines  21  -
Concentration  7  1 
Transformation, conversion  1  -
Enrichment  6  -
Fuel  Preparation  5  -
Fuel  Fabrication  19  3 
Reprocessing  14  -
Research  Reactors  51  3 
Zero Energy Critical 
assemblies  15  2 
Power Reactors  128  7 
Storage  56  2 
TOTAL Euratom  380  22 
TOTAL IAEA  _21 
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Table 11.1.1 
MBAs and installations under Euratom Safeguards 
holding more than or equal one effective kg. 
(Stetus 1992-12-311 
MBAs in Member States 
DK  D  E  F  GR  IRL  I  L 
1  8  1  13  - - 2  -
- 6  1  - - - 1  -
1  2  2  1  - - - -
- - - 1  - - - -
- 2  - 1  - - - -
- - - 2  - - - -
1  7  2  6  - - 1  -
- 1  - 5  - - 2  -
' 
2  14  3  12  1  - 7  -
- 1  1  - 2  - - - -
- 28  10  57  - - 3  -
2  19  - 14  - - 6  1 
7  98  19  114  1  0  22  1 
6  86  16  1  1  0  21  1  -------- -
1)  Under !AEA routine inspection. 
2)  COM stands for Commission of the European Communities 
Chapter II 
J 
MBAs  MBAs 
EUR  IAEA11 
NL  p  UK  COM2) 
2  - 23  3  57  21 
- 13  - - 21  0  ! 
- 1  - - 8  0 
- - - - 1  0 
I  - 2  4  9  6  I  - -
- - 4  - 6  0 
- - 4  - 24  14 
- - 9  - 17  3 
2  1  5  1  51  34 
-
- - 1  - 16  13 
2  - 21  - '  128  50 
- 1  27  4  76  37 
8  16  98  8  414  I 
8  2  7  8  L__  I  178 
-Type 
B 
LOFs equal I above CAM limit  3 
LOFs below CAM limit,  3 
CARRIERS,  INTERMEDIARIES,  1 
WASTE CONDITIONING AND 
OTHERS 
TOTAL Euratom  7 
TOTAL IAEA  6 
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Table 11.1.2. 
LOFs, Intermediaries, Carriers and other installations. 
holding less than 1 effective kg. 
{Status 1992-12-31) 
Member States 
OK  D  E  F  GR  IRL  I  L 
'3  43  1  13  2  2  14  0 
3  38  1  31  0  0  3  0 
1  10  2  2  0  0  8  2 
7  91  4  46  2  2  25  2 
6  79  2  0  2  2  17  0 
2)  COM  stands for Commission of the European Communities. 
Chapter II 
EUR  IAEA I 
NL  p  UK  COM2> 
11  1  21  3  117  82 
I 
i 
3  0  117  0  199  50 
1  2  8  0  37  0 
15  3  146  3  353  I  I 
I 
14  1  0  3  I  132 Chapter II 
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Stocks of nuclear material 
20.  Tho following table 11.2  gives tho stocks of civil nuclear material by the end 
of  1989, 1990, 1991  and  1992 for the  MBAs listed  in  tables  11.1.1.  and 
11.1.2. 
Tpble 11.2 
Stocks of nuclear material as  on 31  December  (in tonnes) 
Material Category  Cat.  1989  1990  1991  1992 
Uranium Depleted  11  D  112 600  124 400  130 600  139 300 
Natural  11  N  47 000  44 000  47 400  47 100 
Low Enriched  1  l  L  28 900  32 000  33 400  35 500 
High Enriched  21  H  13  13  13  13 
Plutonium 21  p  ~70  203  268··>  292•) 
. 
Thorium 11  TH  2 100  2 600  3  200  3 800 
Total effective kg  3)  199 000 kg  231  000 kg  293 000 kg  318 100 kg 
11  Rounded to nearest 100 t. 
21  Rounded to nearest t. 
31  Art. 36(0) of Regulation 3227/76. 
')  It may be noted that on 31.12.92 approximately 72 tonnes of the Plutonium stock wns in form of fresh i.e. 
· reprocessed Plutonium. 
")  The unusual Increase between 1990 and 1991  Is due to the declaration of Pu Production in the power reactors 
upon discharge rather than upon shipment from the site. Chapter II 
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21.  The following table 11.3  gives the distribution of the stocks (end  1992) as a 
function of the MBA type. 
Type 
Research Laboratories 
Research Reactors 
& Critical assembly 
Enrichment 
Fuel Concentration, Fuel 
conversion/Fabrication 
Reprocessing 
Power Reactors 
Storages 
LOF,  Mines, others 
Table 11.3 
Distribution of Stocks (31-12-1992) 
(rounded to the nearest %) 
as per MBA type and element category. 
Element Category 
0  N  L  H 
1  -o  -o  4 
-o  -o  -o  43 
51")  9  ,.,  -o 
1  53  7  13 
-o  -o  2  1 
1  14  47.,  17 
46.,  19  43.,  22 
-o  5  -o  -o 
p 
-o 
1 
-o 
5 
-o··> 
36•••) 
58 
-o 
*)  The significant changes between these figures and those of the equivalent table of the previous report are due to a 
redefinition of the practical boundaries between categories. 
*')  In process only. 
•••)  The  increase between  ~990  and 1991  is due to the declaration of Pu Production in the power reactors  upon 
discharge rather than upon shipment from the site. 
T 
1 
1 
-o 
-o 
-o 
-o 
-o 
98 Chapter II 
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Sttfcguard1UlJlP.I.Q!Hihes ond imolemcntation - Introductory remarks 
22.  Pursuant to Article 79  of the Treaty and  to Articles  9  to 23 of Regulation 
3227/76, tho operators of all installations must establish a nuclear materials 
accounting  system  including  recording  and  reporting,  thereby  documenting 
tho movements and disposition of the nuclear material. 
23.  In other words, the up-to-date inventory of nuclear material by: 
-category of materiaJll 
- safeguards obligation and 
- material balance areas (MBA) 
as established by tho operator needs to bo  made available for verification by 
inspectors,  as  well as  the flow of nuclear materials.  Verification relates  to 
tho sot of activities independently performed  by inspectors to establish the 
correctness of those records  on  flow and  inventory in  comparison  with the 
physical  reality  leading  to  acceptance  or  rejection  of  the  operator's 
declarations. 
24.  There  are  several,  basically  different,  safeguards  verification  techniques, 
certain of which are  quantifiable and  others which are  non-quantifiable.  In 
this  context  referenc'e  is  made  to  paragraphs  22  and  23  of  the  "19BB 
Report" where the basic methodology is outlined and examples are given. 
25.  The.o  is  no  change  in  principle  of  the  safeguards  methodology  which 
continues  to  be  based  on  the  safeguards  goals .  comprising  a  triptych  of 
characteristic  quantities  to  be  detected,  of characteristic  times  describing 
the  maximum  response  times  of  the  safeguards  system  to  an  event  of 
safeguards interest and characteristic probabilities describing both the risk of 
a  false  alarm  and  the  risk  of  non-detection  of  the  quantities  within  the 
specified times. 
1 
26.  As far as,  however, the  safeguards  concepts and  approaches  developed to 
implement the above goals are  concerned, the increased availability and  use 
of Plutonium in the commercial fuel  cycle of the  Community necessitated in 
1989 through 1992 and  continue to necessitate the further improvement of 
safeguards efficiency and the related refinement of safeguards concepts and 
procedures.  A summary of the main developments is reported below. 
' 
1)  Art.  21  of Regulation 3227f76. Chapter II 
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27.  Improvements of the efficiency in safeguarding Uranium have been achieved 
and are expected to be  further achieved gradually through tho deployment of 
improved  instruments and  equipment  and  through  rationalisation  measures 
adapted specifically to tho intermittent inspection regime which is applied at 
the  installations  in  this  part  of tho  fuel  cycle,  including  tho  output  of  the 
mines,  concentration,  conversion,  fabrication  and  enrichment  installations 
(the  latter  require  slightly  different  approaches  due  to  the  inherent 
commercial and non-proliferation sensitivity of the technology used). 
Developments to be  mentioned are the testing and deployment 
of  new  containment  and  surveillance  (C/S)  equipment,  e.g. 
using  front  end  motion  detection and  digital  video,  improved 
methods  used  for  item  verification,  shifting  from  destructive 
assay  (DA)  to non destructive assay  (NDA)  and,  last but not 
least,  improved  on-site  data  acquisition,  handling  and 
evaluation. 
The  implementation  of  "Random"  inspections  the  testing  of 
which  had  been  reported  in  tho  1990  Report,  has  been 
discontinued  by  Euratom.  The  tests  and  further  evaluations 
have shown that any improvements of efficiency, i.e. tho same 
effectivene·ss  with  lower  cost,  would  be  offset  by  more 
complicated and  more costly logistics. Moreover, the adoption 
of a regulation concerning tho. transport of radioactive sources-
an  indisponsaple  component  of  safeguards  measurement 
devices- may render the effectiveness of "random" inspections 
even  more  doubtful  as  such  transports  must  be  notified  in 
advance  to  all  concerned  - including  to  the  operators. 
Randomness of a different kind has, however an important role 
in  the  New  Partnership  arrangements  with  the  lAEA  (see 
Chapter V.) 
28.  In the Uranium part of the fuel cycle as  well as  for LWR  LEU,  no significant 
changes in tho concepts and  approaches can  be  reported  but rather gradual 
increases of efficiency. 
29.  For  LWR-using  fresh Mox•) the  safeguards concepts continue  to be  based 
on  the item verification techniques,  i.e.  based  on  the more  stringent timely 
verification of the integrity and identity of distinguishable fuel elements using 
NDA,  C/S  and  video  surveillance  techniques  from  fabrication and  during  all 
phases of reactor operations.  These concepts have been implemented. 
30.  For  safeguards  of  MOX  fabrication  installations  and  of  reprocessing  plants 
paragraph  101  of the  Operations  Report  covering  1988 (SEC(90)452  final) 
indicated  the  forecast  that  the  throughputs  of  recycled  Plutonium  was 
expected to increase significantly in the late 1980's and early 1990's. 
This has become industrial reality, i.e.: 
•  A large scale reprocessing plant commenced operation in  1989; 
•  Two further large scale reprocessing plants are  under construction and, 
based on present plans, are  scheduled to commence operation in 1994; 
•) MOX =MIXED OXIDE (U+Pu oxide) Chapter II 
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•  One  largo  scale  MOX  fabrication  plant  is  ready  for  operation  and 
awaiting start up licences; 
•  Two large scale MOX fabrication plants are under construction and will 
commence  operation, based  on  present schedules, in  1994 and  1997 
respectively. 
31.  At  these  now  plants  continual  inspection  is  maintained  or  foreseen. 
Following  consultations  with Community  operators  and,  when  appropriate, 
with tho  IAEA,  modern  safeguards  systems  have  been  developed  and  are 
being implemented. 
32.  Moreover, under the aspect of safeguards concocts the well-known concepts 
such as: 
•  verification  of  the· technical  characteristics  of  the  plant  during  tho 
construction phases; 
•  verification  of  tho  continued  validity  of  the  Basic  Technical 
Characteristics (BTC) to be provided pursuant to Regulation 3227  /76; 
•  verification  of  all  input  and  output  streams  and  of  the  physical 
inventory; 
•  verification  of,  at  least  monthly,  of  the  hold-ups  using  various 
techniques; 
•  maintenance  of the  continuity of knowledge  in the input and  product 
stores; 
•  transparency 
are  being used or envisaged in these large scale plants. 
33.  As far, however, as  the approaches are  concerned, the main feature  of the 
safeguards systems for tho new plutonium plants is a significant shift from 
inspector  attended  operation  to  unattended  measurement,  monitoring  or 
surveillance operation. 
This is necessitated, inter alia, by 
a)  the  need  to  minimise  radiation  exposure  of  plant  personnel  and 
inspectors;  , 
b)  tho  need  to  minimise  stoppage  for  routine  safeguards  purposes  of 
automated production; 
c)  the requirement to use  identical  or  similar  components in all  plants so 
as to minimise development costs and to maximise standardisation and, 
notably, 
d)  the  necessity to improve inspectors productivity due  to the  increasing 
difficulties to keep  the  pace  between recruitment programmes and  the 
growth of the inventories and throughputs of the nuclear material. 
34.  The  effect  is,  on  the  one  hand,  a  transition  from  operational  costs,  i.e. 
manpower,  travelling,  subsistence,  etc.  to  investment  costs  which,  albeit 
expensive  initially,  are  expected  to  "pay  off"  within  a  limited  break  even 
time.  On  the  other  hand,  these  systems  are  also  expected  to  minimise 
repetitive  inspectors  work  thereby  further  contributing ·  to  enhanced 
safeguards effectiveness. Chapter II 
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Safeguards approaches and Implementation .:.  Non auantifiable Verification aspects 
35.  Both,  nuclear  material  accountancy  methods  and  containment/surveillance 
and/or monitoring/logging  systems· contain  quantifiable and  non  quantifiable 
aspects.  Indicators  or  results  of  verification  activities,  which  may  be 
expressed  directly or  indirectly  (i.e.  via  calibrations)  in  amounts  of nuclear 
material  or  number of items are  considered  quantifiable, all  others are  non 
quantifiable.  The  following  paragraphs  of this  sub-chapter  report  on  the 
results of a study which was performed in  1993 based  on  more than 6000 
inspection  reports  from  1990  to  1992  in  order  to  review  verification 
performance  including  the  mechanisms  of  detection  of  discrepancies  and 
anomalies. 
36.  Important discrepancies - involving nuclear material with more than  10% of 
the  detection  goals  or  problems  of  a  generic  nature  influencing 
completeness,  correctness  and  reliability  of  the  operators  nuclear  material 
accountancy systems - are reported by the Euratom inspectors at an average 
frequency of about 30-40 per year. The evaluation presented below is based 
on  all  import:mt discrepancies  reported  in  the  3  years  taken  for the  study 
either  by  inspectors  based  on  field  operations  or  based  on  headquarters 
treatment and evaluation of safeguards relevant data. 
The  individual  discrepancies  were  analysed,  as  to  the  activity or  indicator 
which triggered the detection of the problem.  Details are given in Table 11.4. 
Table 11.4 
Type and  frequency of important discrepancies reported from field operations 
IYP-e of Discrepancy  PrQgQrtion 
00 
1. Major shortcomings in operators nuclear material  24 
accountancy system (organisation, quality, 
completeness, correctness) 
2.  Major shortcomings in op_erators  PIT procedures  20 
3.  Detection of undeclared material  1 1 
4.  "Material unaccounted for" not acceptable  10 
5.  Nuclear material not accessible for verification  7 
6.  Nuclear material/equipment not used as  declared  6 
7.  Important discrepancy between declared and 
measured  value  6 
8. Loss of continuity of knowledge {C/S) not due to 
inspectors  equipment  failure  6 
9. Discrepancy related to safeguards obligations  6 
1  O.Detection of undeclared movements by optical 
surveillance/monitoring  2 
11. Discrepancy between declared Basic Technical 
Characteristics and _plant  situation  2 Chapter II 
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37.  The  indicators/activities which identified the  discrepancies  in this  way and 
their frequency are given in table 11.5  below: 
Table 11.5 
Indicators/activities which lead to detection of discrepancy during josoections 
Ivm~  Qf  lndi~D12rl~~1ivltv  ~r!;mQr.t1Qn (%} 
1.  Routine accountancy_ checks  30 
2.  Physical verification by item countinQ and identification  H) 
3.  Inspector questioning validity of either operators' 
accountancy, or source data  13 
4.  Inspector performing non-routine checks, or visits/chocks in 
areas not normally inspected  8 
5.  Check of Basic Technical Characteristics, use of nuclear 
material, obliQation  7 
6.  Physical measurements (weighing, NDA, DA, etc.)  6 
7.  Review of C/S or monitorinn/loQging data  6 
8.  Inspectors noticing un-usual operations, manipulations, 
transfers, etc.  6 
9.  Specific information received from operators/contractors 
staff  5 
1  0. Other information 
I  4 
38.  Analysing  the data on  discrepancies in more  detail  as  far  as  tho  jnsoectors 
who  detected/reported  the  discrepancies  are  concerned,  the  following 
correlations were noted: 
(a)  there is  a correlation with the  length of the service  in  the European 
Commission, e.g. more than 4-5 years in the service, 
(b)  there is a correlation with the  period  of time in the same  inspection 
group or cluster, 
(c)  there  is  a correlation  with high  specific  experience  and  knowledge 
on the operation of the plant inspected, Chapter II 
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(d)  there  is  a  correlation  between  tho  discrepancies  detected  per 
country  and  the  degroo  of  familiarity  of  an  inspector  with  the 
language and other important features of that country. 
(e)  there is, as could be  expected, a correlation with the professionality 
of tho inspectors. 
39.  Tho analysis showed, that non-quantifiable aspects play a major role  in tho 
following areas: 
(a)  indicators arising  from  activities, whore an  operator's declaration is 
checked  by the inspector: the detection of an  alarm  or  discrepancy 
depends  to  a  large  degree  on  tho  judgement  and  professional 
experience  of  the  individual  inspector  and/or  the  collective 
experience of tho safeguards system as a whole; 
(b)  indicators, which come from various sources outside the safeguards 
system including operators,  Member State authorities, media, other 
Commission or Community institutions, third states or the IAEA. 
40.  Tho  major conclusions  from  the  analysis/discussion  can  be  summarised  as 
follows: 
•  overall  safeguards  assurances  are  difficult,  if  not  impossible  to 
quantify, 
•  there are  quantifiable and  non-quantifiable aspects involved in  both, 
nuclear material accountancy and in other safeguards measures such 
as CIS, monitoring and logging systems, 
•  there  are  essential  pre-requisites  necessary  in  order  that  non-
quantifiable aspects can become effective, 
•  the inspector's competence, profile, and  knowledge of the plant and 
the related safeguards concept is of the utmost importance, 
•  more flexibility and  unpredictability in  inspection activities - but not 
"random" inspections- is another important element, 
•  there  are  headquarters  activities  which  are  essential  for  the 
effectiveness  of  a  safeguards  system  and  are  non-quantifiable  by 
their nature, 
•  it is  not  necessary  for  safeguards  assurances  to  be  quantified  for 
them to be  useful. Chapter II 
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41 .  The study performed was a first attempt, based  on an empirical approach, to 
identify  with  concreto  examples  non-quantifiable  aspects  in  nuclear 
safeguards.  Tho  basis  chosen  was the examination  of the  performance  of 
the  Euratom  Safeguards Inspectorate with regard  to anomaly detection and 
the detection of alarms or discrepancies over a 3 years period.  The analysis 
yielded  a  variety  of  examples  of  non-quantifiable  indicators  or  activities 
which play an  important role  in nuclear safeguards but the analysis has also 
left open a number of questions which will be  further pursued. Chapter II 
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Safeguards approaches and implementation- Survey of Verification techniques 
42.  The following Table 11.6.  provides an  indication of the verification techniques 
deployed.  Table  II. 7.  provides  the  typical  frequency  of  inspection  and  the 
Euratom  inspection effort spent  at the various types of installations.  Table 
11.8  provides the inspection effort spent in the  Community Member States. 
Table 11.6 
VERIFICATION TECHNIQUE  TYPE{S} OF INSTALLATION 
•  verification and periodic 
reverification of Basic Technical  all types 
Characteristics (BTC) 
•  audit of accounts  all types 
' 
item counting and identification  all types 
•  measurement and sampling: 
- weighing  - research  laboratories,  research 
reactors & critical assemblies 
- concentration, conversion 
- enrichment, fabrication and 
reprocessing plants 
- (certain) power reactors 
- (certain) storage installations 
- others 
- non-destructive assay (NDA)  - research  laboratories,  research 
reactors & crit. assemblies 
- concentration, conversion 
- enrichment, fabrication and 
reprocessing plants 
- power reactors 
- storage installations 
- sample taking for destructive  - research laboratories 
assay (DA)  - concentration, conversion 
- enrichment, fabrication and 
reprocessing plants 
- storage installations 
- participation in calibration  - research laboratories 
exercises of equipment  - concentration, conversion 
- enrichment, fabrication and 
reprocessing plants 
- storage installations 
- appropriate measurements  - LOF etc. 
(NDA and/or DA) on a low 
sampling basis Chapter II 
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Table 11.6 
(Cant)  . 
~EBIEI~8IIQ~  IE~t:JNIQUE.  TYPE(S) OF INSTALLATION 
•  containment, surveillance and 
monitoring: 
- seals  - research  laboratories,  research 
reactors & crit. assemblies 
- concentration, conversion 
- enrichment, fabrication and 
reprocessing plants 
- power reactors 
- storage installations 
- camera I video surveillance  - research  laboratories,  research 
reactors & crit. assemblies 
- concentration, conversion 
- enrichment, fabrication and 
reprocessing plants 
- power reactors 
- storage installations 
- independent monitoring of key data  - enrichment 
(tank levels, temperatures and other  - fabrication plants 
. operator data)  - reprocessing plants 
- following detailed process  - fabrication plants 
operations and flows within the  - reprocessing plants 
plant 
- monitoring /logging systems·  - enrichment plants 
- power reactors 
- research reactors and critical 
assemblies 
- reprocessing plants 
- storage installations Chapter II 
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Safeguards aoproaches and implementation - Inspection effort 
43.  The following Tables II. 7 and  11.8  provide the figures of tho inspection effort 
per type of installation and in each country. 
Table 11.7 
Typical inspection effort per tvpc of Installation 
Type of installation  Typical frequency of  Inspection effort - man-days 
inspection ranging  Euratom 
From  To 
1990  1991  1992 
Research laboratories  1/a  12/a  313  352  435 
Research reactors  &  critical  2/a  6/a  342  227  249 
assemblies 
Mines  and  concentration  0/a  2/a  12  16  23 
plants 
Enrichment plants  12  1/week  677  643  666 
Conversion and fabrication  12/a  1/week  1102  1011  1058 
(uranium natural, LEU) 
Conversion and fabrication  12/a  .  continual  1322  1491  1356 
(HEU  and  MOX) 
Reprocessing  12/a  continual  2275  2067  2130 
(when not 
operating) 
Power reactors  2/a  24/a  921  984  929 
Storage installations  1  /a  daily  537  906  849 
Other  (LOF, etc  ... )  0 ")  4/a  63  60  221.") 
7564  7757 
•)  Holders of small amounts of depleted and natural uranium or thorium used f01  non-nuclear purposes are 
inspected on a sampling basis or when discrepancies following declarations (also from other operators) need to 
be resolved. 
••)  Includes specific effort for verification of basic technical characteristics in large-scale Pu processing plants not 
yet operational. 
7916 Country 
BELGIUM 
DENMARK 
GERMANY 
GREECE 
SPAIN 
FRANCE 
IRELAND 
ITALY 
LUXEMBOURG 
THE  NETHERLANDS 
PORTUGAL 
UNITED KINGDOM 
COMMISSION 
TOTAL 
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Table 11.8 
Cumulated Inspection Effort per Country 
(Expressed in mandays I year and %) 
Mondays  Mondays  Mondays 
1989  1990  1991 
594  627  627 
21  18  33 
2237  2170  1823 
6  4  5 
170  147  185 
2013  2408  2572 
2  2  2 
165  155  101 
0  0  0 
'137  129  130 
7  6  5 
I 
1967  1812  2187 
98  86  71 
7417  7564  7757 
Chapter II 
Mondays  % 
1992  1992 
740  9.35 
15  0.18 
1323  16.1 
4  0.05 
202  2.55 
2838  35.86 
2  0.02 
71  0.89 
0  0.0 
160  2.02 
4  0.05 
2462  31.11 
92  1.16 
7916  100.00 Chapter II 
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44.  In  relation  to tables  11.6  and  II. 7  it may  be  noted  that the  frequency  and 
intensity  of  inspections  are  also  influenced  by  the  established  quantified 
inspection goals which depend on the strategic value, amounts and types of 
nuclear material,  on  the  probabilities  of detection and  the  detection times. 
These  quantified inspection goals are  reviewed  from time to time so as  to 
take account of new safeguards concepts and  of the  progress· in research 
and development. 
45.  The  safeguards  approaches  for  "mixed•  MBA's  (see  para.19)  differ  from 
those applied elsewhere in respect of their objective: 
•  For installations handling civil material exclusively the objective set out 
in Article 77 of the Treaty applies to all nuclear material in inventory or 
throughputll, 
•  For  installations  handling  or  storing·  civil  and  non-civil  material 
simultaneously or sequentially the objective set out in Article 77 of the 
Treaty applies equally to this civil material, a  key condition being  that 
there should  be  no net loss in quantity and  quality of the civil material 
in a plant. 
46.  Whenever discrepancies are detected: 
•  within the operator's accounting system 
•  between two operators 
•  from  information obtained through the IAEA or  through third countries 
for exports I imports into and out of the Community 
•  between operator's records, reports and inspection findings 
they are followed up immediately. Anomalies are unresolved discrepancies or 
prima  facie  evidence  of  an  irregularity  discovered  as  a  result  of 
records/reports examination or other inspection activities which may lead to 
the opinion that the terms of the Treaty or  other legal  instruments have  not 
been  respected. The  resolution of anomalies requires  a sequence  of actions 
normally  additional  to  the  safeguards  measures  indicated  in  table  11.6. 
Anomalies once fully established, i.e. unresolvable, would be  reported to and 
considered by the Commis3ion as a presumed infringement of the Treaty. 
1)  Plus, where applicable, to the equipment. Chapter II 
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Safeguards approaches and implementation - Findings 
4 7.  The following paragraphs of this chapter provide  findings resulting  from the 
application of the safeguards measures in 1991 and  1992. 
Research laboratories, research reactors &  critical assemblies 
48.  The safeguards measures applied at these installations are  described in table 
11.6, the inspection effort spent is described in table II. 7. 
49.  Following  the  reports  of  the  inspectors,  78  (15%)  statements  after 
inspection or separate communications were dispatched containing particular 
observations requiring follow-up. 
50.  These  communications  and  direct  consultations  with  operators  or 
government authorities  aim  at  further  improving  safeguards  implementation 
relating, inter alia, to: 
•  the promptness and  correctness of records and declarations; 
•  the inventories of diificul-to-access nuclear materials; 
•  the definition of safeguards measures to be  applied to nuclear materials 
contained in  wastes and discards. 
Mines and concentration plants 
51.  The safeguards measures applied at these installations are  described in table 
11.6  and the inspection effort spent is described in table II. 7. 
52.  Following the reports of the inspectors, 7  (43 %) statements a·fter  inspection 
or  separate  communications  were  dispatched  containing  particular 
observations requiring follow-up. 
Enrichment plants 
53.  The safeguards measures applied  at these installations are  described in table 
11.6,  the inspection effort spent is described in table II. 7. 
54.  Following the reports of the inspectors,  11  (4%) statements after inspection 
or  separate  communications  were  dispatched  containing  particular 
observations requiring follow-up. Chapter II 
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55.  In relation to centrifuge enrichment plants it may be  noted that; In  1983 an 
international  project,  referred  to  as  tho  Hexa  partite  Safeguards  Project, 
provided recommendations on how commercial centrifuge enrichment plants 
should be safeguarded while minimising tho risk of dissemination of sensitive 
technology. 
56.  These  recommendations  to  tho  IAEA  included,  apart  from  tho  "classical" 
safeguards  measures  listed  in  table  11.6  above,  "limited  Frequency 
Unannounced Access" (LFUA) to tho cascade areas during which inspectors 
can  satisfy themselves  that the  plants  are  operating  as  declared  by the 
operator.  Euratom  observes  these  recommendations  for  the  inspections 
conducted together with tho IAEA. As to tho inspections in tho enrichment 
plant in which tho Commission  operates alone, these  recommendations are 
applied as adjusted to tho particular plant design. 
57.  In  1990  Euratom  was  informed  that  significant  changes  in  enrichment 
technology  wore  taking  place  requiring  adaptations  of  tho  safeguards 
approaches  for  such  plants.  The  necessary  consultations  with  plant 
operators,  government  authorities  and  tho  IAEA  have  been  initiated  and 
continue. 
58.  Tho  above  mentioned  communications  and  consultations  with operators  or 
government authorities continue, thus, in order to further improve safeguards 
implementation relating, inter alia, to: 
•  the  use  of  instruments  for  Non-Destructive  Assay  (NDA) 
measurements  inside  the  cascade  area  and  the  application  of 
Containment and Surveillance (C/S) devices; 
•  further  improvement  of  the  Non  Destructive  Assay  (NDA) 
measurements for the depleted uranium tails; 
•  measures to verify conclusively that there  has  been  no net loss  of 
civil  material  in  certain  installations  relating,  in  particular,  to 
procedures for the taking of the physical inventory. 
Conversion plants, fuel preparation plants and fabrication plants 
processing natural uranium and/or low enriched uranium 
59.  The safeguards measures applied at these installations are  described in table 
11.6, the inspection effort spent is described in table II. 7. 
60.  Following the reports of the inspectors, 14 (8%) statements after inspection 
or  separate  communications  were  dispatched  containing  particular 
observations requiring follow-up. Chapter II 
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61.  These  communications  and  direct  consultations  with  operators  or 
government authorities aim  at further improving  safeguards  implementation 
relating, inter alia, to: 
•  Take  account  of  certain ·technological  developments  which  have 
strongly influenced tho safeguards activities at these  facilities,  e.g. 
the availability of modern  instrumentation based  on  neutron  and/or 
gamma  techniques.  These  modern  instruments  are  being 
progressively introduced in tho field  and  will load to more effective 
safeguards. 
Conversion/fabrication plants processing highly enriched uranium and/or 
plutonium 
62.  Tho safeguards measures applied at those installations are described in table 
11.6,  the inspection effort spent is  described in table II. 7. It should be  noted 
that  for  those  installations  the  safeguards  approach  usually  results  in  a 
continuous inspection regime. 
63.  Following the reports of the inspectors, 20 (8%) statements after inspection 
or  separate  communications  were  dispatched  containing  particular 
observations requiring follow-up. 
64.'  These  communications  and  direct  consultations  with  operators  or 
government authorities aim  at  further improving  safeguards implementation 
relating, inter alia, to: 
•  the definition and  implementation of projects to enable safeguards in 
these major plants; 
•  the  testing  and  implementation  of  further  advanced  safeguards 
approaches; 
•  comprehensive  verification  measurements 
instrumentation  such  as  unattended  measuring 
advanced CIS equipment; 
•  physical inventory taking procedures; 
by  modern 
stations  and 
•  progressive  resolution  of issues  related  to the  "mixed" character of 
certain plants; 
•  replacement  of a large  number  of transports  of  samples  by  on-site 
analysis. Chapter II 
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Reprocessing plants 
65.  The safeguards measures applied at these installations are described in table 
11.6,  the inspection effort spent is described in table II.  7. It should  be  noted 
that  for  these  installations  the  safeguards  approach  usually  results  in  a 
continuous inspection regime during the operation of the installations. 
66.  Following  the  reports  of  the  inspectors,  45  (24%)  statements  after 
inspection or separate communications were dispatched containing particular 
observations requiring follow-up. 
67.  These  communications  and  direct  consultations  with  operators  or 
government authorities aim  at further improving  safeguards implementation 
relating, inter alia, to: 
•  Fully transparent records/reports systems; 
•  In-process monitoring and/or CIS applications; 
•  Comprehensive  verification  measurements  by  modern 
instrumentation; 
•  Progressive resolution of issues related to the  "mixed" character of 
certain plants; 
•  Replacement of a large  number of transports of samples  by on-site 
analysis.  · 
68.  As referred to in para.  30 above the main developments in  1991  and  1992 
related  to  the  preparations  for  and  the  coming  on  stream  of  three 
reprocessing plants of large throughput and complexity.  This entailed: 
•  Obtaining detailed technical characteristics, detailed drawings, flow-
sheets, process parameters etc.; 
•  Development of safeguards approaches; 
•  Intensive consultations with operators and government authorities; 
•  Determination  of  relevant  specifications  and  planning  of  contracts 
for the safeguards system to be installed; 
•  Verification of BTC and  of tank calibration prior to start up; 
•  Commencement  of  BTC  verification  (for  one  plant  in  construction 
stage); 
•  Preparation for final  Commission  approval  under Article 78.2 of the 
Treaty (for two plants); Chapter II 
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•  Commission  interim  approval  under  Article  78.2 of tho  Treaty  (for 
ono plant); 
•  Implementation of safeguards at ono plant following start-up. 
69.  Apart from the problems duo to tho unprecedented complexity of such now 
plants,  the  activities reported  in  para.  68  above  for tho  new  reprocessing 
plants do not give rise to particular observations. 
Power reactors pnd storage Installations 
70.  The safeguards measures applied at these installations are  described in table 
11.6, the inspection effort spent is described in table II. 7. 
71.  Following the reports of tho inspectors, 53 (4%) statements after inspection 
or  separate  communications  were  dispatched  containing  particular 
observations requiring follow-up. 
72.  These  communications  and  direct  consultations  with  operators  or 
government authorities aim  at further improving  safeguards  implementation 
relating, inter alia, to: 
•  Step  by  step  replacement  of  film  cameras  by  modern  video 
equipment; 
•  Introduction, whore applicable, of monitoring and logging systems; 
•  Re-measuremont  of  nuclear  materials  under  effective  containment 
and surveillance systems; 
•  Introduction of NDA measurements on  fresh fuel stored under water. 
73.  It should be  reported that also during  1991  and  1992 considerable resources 
in  terms  of  both  equipment  and  manpower  were  invested  in  applying 
safeguards  in  light  water  reactors  using  fresh  MOX  fuel.  The  inspection 
scheme  involves  using  containment/surveillance  (C/S)  equipment  to  the 
maximum extent, however the  inspection manpower spent is still  too high. 
Efforts  further  to improve  the  CIS  equipment  with the  aim  of  achieving  a 
better balance between equipment and manpower are  ongoing. Chapter II 
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Locations outside facilities CLOFJ  and other installations 
7 4.  Tho safeguards measures applied at these installations are  described in table 
11.6, the inspection effort spent is described in table II. 7. 
75.  At such installations which include those where uranium or thorium is being 
used  for  non-nuclear  purposes  (e.g.  shielding,  aircraft  counter  weights, 
production of lamps, catalysts, ceramics) and those installations at the back 
end  of the fuel cycle (not including, of course, reprocessing),  safeguards, in 
specific  instances,  may  rely  more  on  the  verification  of  Basic  Technical 
Characteristics (BTC), than on  other concepts. The  discussion, however, to 
which  intensity  such  measures  are  to  be  performed  has  not  yet  been 
concluded but considerable progress was achieved in so far as: 
•  the coverage, at least from the point of view of records and  reports 
of such installations has been further extended; 
•  discussions with government authorities have resulted in the design 
of a scheme which will take full  advantage  of the existing systems 
at national level thereby saving Euratom resources. 
76.  On  the  other  hand,  it  should  be  mentioned  that  at  these  installations 
operators frequently are  not aware of their safeguards obligations, including 
nuclear  materials  accounting.  This  is  why Euratom  continues  to  spend  a 
considerable effort in administration and other follow-up measures to ensure 
full  adherence  to  the  legal  requirements.  This  resulted  in  39 %1> of  the 
communications to operators of such installations requiring follow-uo. 
77.  As  far  as  waste  treatment  and  disposal  installations  are  concerned,  the 
discussions  on  the implementation  of appropriate  safeguards  techniques to 
be  applied are still ongoing. 
1)  21% In 1988, 35% for period 1989-1990 Chapter Ill 
- 28-
Ill.  A  C C 0  U N  T A  N C Y 
General 
78.  Following  the  prov1s1ons  of  the  Treaty and  Regulation  3227/76,  a  nuclear 
material  accounting  system  is  established  at  all  instalfations  as  described 
above.  Reports  are  submitted  according  to  the  legal  provisions  to  the 
Euratom  Safeguards  Directorate  (DCS).  Where  appropriate,  and  following 
processing  by  Euratom,  accounting  reports  are  submitted  to  the  IAEA, 
pursuant to the Verification Agreements. 
79.  At the  installations  the  nuclear  material  accounting  system  comprises  the 
records  and  reports  required  in  Regulation  3227/76  and  in  the  Particular 
Safeguard Provisions. These records must be complete, consistent with each 
other  and  with  the  physical  reality,  and  must  be  reflected  in  the  reports 
provided  to  DCS  headquarters.  Relating  to  these  accounting  reports  the 
following table provides the number of records transmitted  to DCS. 
Records providing for  Records providing for 
Year  Inventory Changes  Physical Inventories and  Total 
material balances 
1991  437 741  398 916  836 657 
1992  538 960  435 734  974 694 
80.  The audits of these operation declarations are  carried out during inspections 
to check the above, and  any remarks arising  are addressed to the  operators 
and  followed  up  for  actions.  A  particularly  important  task  is  the  physical 
inventory exercise  where  the  books  are  updated  and  audited  and  physical 
inventories  are  verified,  compared  and  any  difference  identified  and 
investigated. 
81.  The  activities  at  DCS  headquarters  comprise  the  independent  updating  of 
accounts by installation based on the reports received pursuant to Regulation 
3227/76, consistency checks between inspection findings and  accountancy 
reports provided by the  operators,  control of external obligations and  transit 
accountancy. Chapter Ill 
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Accounting system 
82.  The  accounting  system  for  nuclear  material  follows  the  classical  rules  of 
bookkeeping  with  respect  to  the  nuclear  materials  under  safeguards,  the 
basic  objective  being  that  at  all  times  the  book  inventories  reflect  the 
physical reality as closely as possible in terms of amounts and timing. 
83.  All nuclear material accounting systems must provide for periodic  exercises 
to take  and  verify the  physical  inventory.  The  frequency  depends  on  the 
detection times which in themselves depend  on  the nature and  amounts of 
materials involved in the flows and  inventory in the installation. The  normal 
frequency for "wash-out" type of inventory taking is once  per year whereas 
the time interval of "snapshots" of the physical inventory in large  plutonium 
plants may be  as short as 2-4 weeks. The timing may depend on  operational 
constraints.  The  objective  of the  exercise  is  to compare  the  physical  and 
book situations and make adjustments as necessary to ensure that the books 
continue to reflect the reality as  closely as  possible.  Each  exercise leads to 
an  evaluation  to  assess  the  acceptability  of  any  book/physical  inventory 
difference in relation to the activities performed. 
84.  The  comparison  between  inspection  findings  and  records/reports  for 
activities between physical inventories is a further important element of the 
chain  which leads  to the  decision  whether or  not the  operator's  accounts 
can  be  accepted  by the  safeguards  inspectors  or  whether follow-up within 
the appropriate time intervals has  to be  performed.  The  necessity for such 
follow-up is frequent and  requires  in certain cases  long  term inspection and 
evaluation  activities  until  a  satisfactory  resolution  of  the  discrepancies  is 
established. Chapter Ill 
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External obligations 
85.  Tho  control  of  external  obligations  is  a  further  check,  concerning  the 
adherence to the provisions of the Community's nuclear agreements with the 
USA,  Canada  and  Australia  and/or  to the  contractual  provisions  requiring 
peaceful  use  only.  The  checks  are  based  on  accountancy  tracking  by 
obligation  (sometimes referred  to as  flag  control) and  encompass particular 
exports and  imports  and  preparation  of annual  reports  (balance  sheets)  as 
required  for  the  third  States.  Important  items  ~re  the  administrative 
procedures  and  inspection  activities  related  to  approval  and  follow-up  of 
exchanges of safeguarding obligations. 
86.  All such exchanges of safeguarding obligations are  approved and carried  out 
according to a set of technical criteria which guarantee that only equivalent 
amounts of nuclear materials are  exchanged.  Equivalence  must be  obtained 
for  tho  materials  involved.  A  condition  of  performing  any  exchange  of 
safeguarding  obligations  is  that  the  obligation  involved  with  the  most 
stringent constraints shall not lose in quality or quantity. 
87.  International  "flag swaps" are  exchanges  of safeguarding  obligations where 
one  quantity  of  material  is  located  outside  the  Community  and  the  other 
inside.  During the  1991  - 1992 period, no such exchanges wore performed. 
A  request  for an  international  "flag-swap"  made  by the  European  industry 
during  the  period  1991  - 1992  was  rejected  by  one  of  the  third  states 
involved. 
88.  Internal  "flag  swaps"  are  exchanges  of  safeguarding  obligations  where 
quantities of nuclear material exchanged are  subject to Euratom safeguards. 
The  technical  evaluation  of internal  "flag-swaps"  is  based  on  criteria  that 
were  updated  during  the  calendar  year  1992,  after  consultation  with  the 
European nuclear industry. 
The  practical application of the new criteria will be  closely monitored during 
the following years and  reviewed if need be. 
Tho following table gives the data on internal flag swaps: 
Year  Applications  Approved  Not-approved  Withdrawn 
1990  36  34  0  2 
1991  29  25  0  4 
1992  40  40  0  0 Chapter Ill 
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89.  As  regards  problems  with  respect  to  certain  parts  of  Chapter  VI  of  the 
Treaty,  tho  role  of  Euratom  safeguards  is  restricted  to  monitoring  and 
reporting. 
Transit accounting 
90.  In the Euratom system, receivers are obliged to report movements in exactly 
the same way as  the shipper. Transit accounting  is the cross check at the 
level of the reports received from operators that in fact the nuclear materials 
are  reported  as  having  been  received  as  shipped.  As far as  shipments and 
receipts  inside  the  European  Community  are  concerned,  the  Safeguards 
Directorate  follows  up  each  transfer  automatically  until  the  official 
confirmation  of  tho  receipt  is  available.  This  may  involve  physical 
verifications,  and  any  discrepancy  between  shipper  reports  and  receiver 
reports  automatically  triggers  a  follow-up  action  which  may  lead  to  an 
anomaly.  All  discrepancies  must  be  resolved  or  justified.  If  justified,  the 
receiver is nevertheless obliged to report the movement in the same way as 
the shipper accompanied by an appropriate shipper-receiver difference report. 
91.  The response time of the Euratom safeguards system to such differences in 
reports  on  transit  is  less  than  a  month  for  Plutonium  and  highly  enriched 
Uranium.  This  detection  mechanism  of  diversions  is  of  fundamental 
importance.  It  may  be  reported  that  in  1991  and  1992  all  open  transit 
differences were resolved after appropriate follow-up action. 
92.  A  further feature  of this activity is  the contribution to the world-wide IAEA 
system of nuclear material control. The Community record  has always been 
good  in this respect and  this exercise  has  allowed Euratom to observe that 
certain countries  outside the  Community do  not report  on  time  or  with the 
necessary precision. The  Commission continues to help  the IAEA in solving 
problems of this type. 
Concluding remark 
93.  The  above  controls  and  audits  provide  the  necessary  verifications  to 
determine  whether  the  relevant  provisions  of  the  Euratom  Treaty,  the 
agreements with third country suppliers and the safeguards agreements with 
IAEA  are  being  complied  with.  As  regards  accountancy  of  safeguards 
obligations,  balance  sheets  and  exchanges  of  safeguarding  obligations,  no 
particular  observations  apply  for  the  period  considered  in  this  report.  The 
usual  follow-up  required  in  the  cases  of  late  submission · of  reports, 
incomplete records and reports and/or of discrepancies took place.  · Chapter IV 
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IV.  8 E S 0  U R C E S 
Inspection manoower resources 
94.  Tho  development  of  tho  staff  of  tho  Euratom  Safeguards  Directorate  is 
displayed in tho following table IV.1. This table also displays tho inspection 
effort spent and tho amounts of nuclear material under safeguards. 
Table IV.l 
Staff DCS  Operational  Inspection  Nuclear material 
Year  inspectors  mondays  under safeguards 
spent  in eff. kg. 
Index  Index  Index  (by 1000)  Index 
1982  179  100  108  100  4 489  100  78  100 
1985  188  105  125  116  6 225  139  121  155 
1986  202  113  134  124  6 196  138  139  177 
1987  212  118  139  129  6 814  152  158  202 
1988  228  127  155  144  7 364  164  179  229 
1989  230  128  157  145  7 417  165  199  255 
1990  227  127  163  151  7 564  169  231  296 
1991  241  135  173  160  7 757  173  293  376 
1992  263  147  199  184  7 916  176  318  408 
95.  The  following  additional  remarks  should  be  taken  into  account  when 
considering table IV.1: 
a)  Inspection  effort  is  calculated  through  an  internationally  accepted 
definition  (reference  for  example:  Art.  98  L  of  the  Verification 
Agreement),  i.e.  " ...  a  man-day  being  a  day  during  which a  single 
inspector has access to a facility at any time for a total of not more 
than eight hours". 
b)  In addition to the inspection effort spent by Euratom, the IAEA spent 
the following inspection effort in the Community: 
Table IV.2 
Year  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992 
man-days of 
inspection in  3070  3442  3854  3591  3565  3615  3426  2195 
the Community Chapter IV 
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c)  The  increase  (in  effective kg)  of nuclear materials is  dominated  by 
plutonium.  Currently  most  plutonium  under  safeguards  is  in  store 
either in the form of irradiated fuel awaiting reprocessing  or in oxide 
form in containers. 
96.  While it would be  misleading to link safeguards effectiveness exclusively to 
inspection effort spent it is  nevertheless a fact that the increase in nuclear 
materials must be  and  has  been  accompanied  by an  increase  in  inspection 
manpower.  However,  increase  in  pure  inspection  effort  spent  has  been 
limited but accompanied by additional auditing, development, evaluation and 
follow-up at headquarters. 
97.  Safeguards inspectors work in  an environment where they may be  exposed 
to  radiation  by,  contamination  with  and  incorporation  of  radioactive 
substances.  Appropriate  repeated  training  and  continuous  surveillance  of 
Euratom  safeguards inspectors is  therefore an  absolute  necessity.  For this 
purpose tho Medical Service of the Commission, the Safeguards Directorate 
and  the  dosimetry  department  of  the  Joint  Research  Centre  in  lspra 
cooperate  closely  to  ensure  optimum  radiation  exposure  control,  related 
· health physics services, appropriate training and,  notably, strict and  regular 
medical  examinations  without  which  no  staff  member  is  permitted  to 
perform inspections at nuclear installations. 
Whereas  the  (current)  annual  limit is  50 mSv the  following  distribution  of 
radiation dose uptake was determined for 1992 for the Euratom safeguards 
inspectors and technical staff: 
•  147 staff  <  1 mSv 
55  "  1 - 2 mSv  • 
•  9  "  2-3 mSv 
•  5  ..  3-4  mSv 
•  2  "  4-5 mSv 
0  ..  5-6 mSv  • 
•  1  "  6-7 mSv 
Inspection manpower resource's until 1995 
98.  In view of the continuing  increase  in the  number and  complexity of nuclear 
installations  within  the  European  Community  and,  in  particular,  the 
corresponding increase  of civil  nuclear material to be  safeguarded, the need 
should  be  recognised  to  continue  to  augment  the  number  of  nuclear 
safeguards inspectors within the years to come. 
99.  More specifically, the reasons for the additional manpower requirements are: 
a)  To meet the challenge  posed  by three large  reprocessing  plants and 
two large MOX fabrication plants, unprecedented in scale scheduled 
to start operations between 1989 and  1994 (One  such plant started 
in 1989). Chapter IV 
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b)  To  ensure  that  the  safeguards  coverage  will  keep  pace  with  the 
evolution of the nuclear industry in the Community and  in particular 
with the increasing uso  of plutonium in storages or in MOX fuel  for 
nuclear electricity generation purposes; 
c)  To improve  safeguards  further at complex installations,  particularly 
at installations  where  both  civil  and  non-civil  nuclear  material  are 
handled either simultaneously or sequentially. 
d)  To make a safeguards contribution to tho support in tho nuclear field 
to tho independent republics of the former Soviet Union  CFSU,  CIS). 
This  appears  essential  as  the  initial  activities  performed  <•> 
demonstrate  that  the  safeguards  systems  in  the  FSU  states. are 
either non-existent or in need of considerable improvement. 
100. Whereas, the Commission informed tho  Council  in  1989 that a total of 99 
inspection posts will be  needed  in the period to 31.12.1995 this plan could 
not be  implemented duo to budget shortages and the change  of priorities.  It 
may  be  noted  from  Table  IV.1  that  the  level  of  staffing  of the  Euratom 
inspectorate  has  grown  in  a  rather  moderate  way  since  1991  despite 
growing and  additional tasks.  This situation is not expected to improve  in 
tho  short  term . and  a  consequential  decrease  of  Euratom  safeguards 
effectiveness may result. 
Ooerationpl credits 
101. Budget  chapter  B4.2  provides  tho  credits  for  the  operation  of  Euratom 
safeguards  excluding  staff cost and  excluding  cost  for  the  computer main 
frames: 
a) 
b) 
c) 
d) 
Budget line B4 2000: 
Budget line B4 2010: 
Budget line B4 2020: 
Budget line B4 2021: 
missions 
training, meetings and exports 
procurement of instruments, sample 
analysis, transport, temporary staff, 
technical and scientific studies, 
informatics software and  PCs. 
large plutonium processing plants.  The 
Commission has introduced this budget 
line in view of the significant 
investments necessary. (Ref. para. 30-
34 above). 
In  addition,  budget  line  AO  1420  provides  for  costs  associated  with 
radioprotection of inspectors. 
(•)  PleASe refer to Chapters VI and VII below. Chapter IV 
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1  02. The following credits were made available over the last five years (in MECU): 
1989  1990  1991  1992  1993 
84 2000  2,100  2,250  2,350  2,800  3,500 
84 2010  0,130  0,120  0,105  0,125 
•) 
84 2020  2,500  3,800  2,300  2,125  2,000 
84 2021  I  I  2,600  4,416  5,000 
Total  4,730  6,170  7,355  9,466  10,500 
AO  1420  0,114  0,155  0,140  0,380  0,445 
Consumed resources  99,81  99,99  99,22  99,80  --
(%) 
Instruments. methods pnd techniques 
103. At the  end  of  1992, the  Safeguards  Directorate  possessed  the  following 
equipment used either at nuclear installations or at headquarters. 
EURATOM EQUIPMENT on 31·12-92 
A, Gamma equipment  B. Neutron equipment 
• 
1  NIS PITMAN } hand held  2  SAM II/SNAP 
7  HM4  } syst.  4  Cercueil (pins) 
10  SAM II  (2 channel syst.)  1  Octagon (waste) 
2  Enrichment meters  13  HLNCC (Pu) 
10  Pu  meters  . 1 1  NCC  (fuel elements) 
24  Davidson MCA  's  5  AWCC (HEU,  LEU) 
7  Silena Ciceros  4  Phonid (LEU,  HEU) 
4  Gamma & Neutron  3  CIND (UF6 cyl.) 
Measurement stations  4  UFBR  (FBR  ass., Pu cyl.) 
2  MTR scanners  4  Inventory sample counter 
4  Canberras  6  Hexagones 
4  Element Counters 
1  Pin Counter 
')  Part or 84-2000 as fro 1993 C.  C/S eauipmeot 
49  Minolta camera units 
5  Ministar TV systems 
31  MIVS TV systems 
4 7  EUR video systems (TLRl 
35  VACOSS seals 
1 0  Night vision devices 
5  P.S.U. 
1  Gemini System 
Chapter IV 
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D.  •other· equipment 
1 
4 
1 
1 
1 
11 
14 
3 
1 
Pebble Sampling Device 
ION-1  FORK (spent fuel) 
UF6 mass spectrometer 
U02 mass spectrometer 
Potentiometer (U-factor) 
Various reference materials 
Ultrasonic thickness gauges 
Load cells 
K-edge densitometer 
Spectrophometer 
Total: 354 INSTRUMENTS at tho end of 1992- (31 0 end of 1990) 
1  04. The  application  of technical measures for nuclear materials verification and 
containment/surveillance has largely increased  over the last few years. This 
is illustrated in Fig.  1 attached for tho years 1984 to 1992. The figures show 
(in  percent)  the  number  of  inspections  where  sample  taking,  optical 
surveillance, non destructive assay (NDA) or use of seals is involved. 
105. The use of technical measures per type of installation is illustrated in Figs.  2- · 
5  for  NDA  equipment  (Fig.  21,  optical  surveillance  (Fig.  3),  sample  taking 
(Fig. 4) and use of seals (Fig.  5). The figures are self-explanatory  . 
• 
106. 903 and  1167 samples  were taken  by  inspectors  in  the  field  in  1991  and 
1992  respectively.  588  and  872  samples  were  analysed  on  site  using 
analytical  equipment  or  our  portable  mass  spectrometers.  376  and  283 
samples were transported to the Commission laboratories at Karlsruhe,  lspra 
and Geel, where a total of 982 and 793 chemical analysis were carried out. 
The mean time for transport was 31  days  (53 in  1990), the mean time for 
analysis 38 days (46 days in  1990). The total delay time is decreasing but is 
still unacceptably high . 
An  analysis  of  the  reasons  for  delay  shows  that  transportation  is  a 
significant cause.  The  main reason for these long transportation times is the 
need  to comply fully  with transport  regulations  of radioactive material.  In 
order to overcome this  problem  and  also  for  reasons  of cost effectiveness, 
Euratom has proposed to install two on-site laboratories at La  Hague (France) 
and  Sellafield  (UK).  The  first  steps  for  implementing  this  solution  at 
Sellafield  (design,  safety  aspects,  contracts,  laboratory  clearance ... )  have 
already been taken.  The  commissioning of this laboratory has been delayed 
and should commence by 1995. 
Moreover,  instruments  arc  coming  into  routine  use  which  allow  the 
measurements· of most of such safeguards samples on  site thereby reducing 
the need for transports to a minimum. Chapter IV 
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107. About  16,000 seals  wore  placed  each year  by inspectors during  1991  and 
1992 of which about 2000 seals wero placed each year on nuclear materials 
exported  from  tho  Community.  About  1  7,000  seals  were  removed  and 
verified each year at headquarters. In addition about 7500 paper seals, and 
40 now fibre optic seals were used and field tested in nuclear installations. 
108. During  1992 (1991 ),  832 (936)  films from  optical  surveillance  units were 
developed, reviewed and evaluated at DCS  headquarters in Luxembourg. The 
reliability of tho optical surveillance units was better than 99.8%. From  the 
video  systems, about 500 (450)  video  tapes  were  replaced,  reviewed  and 
evaluated. 
109. Equipment for Non  Destructive Assay (NDA)  was used  for nuclear material 
verifications in  935  and  1007 inspections respectively in  1991  and  1992, 
equivalent to about 44% of the total number of inspections. 
110. Large  plant-installed measurement and  surveillance systems were discussed 
and  designed  in  collaboration  with  the  plant  operators  concerned  for 
reprocessing and fuel fabrication facilities.  6 video systems were installed in 
both 1991 and  1992 in reactors using MOX fuel or in Pu storage facilities. 
Informatics 
111. The  following  main  systems  are  presently  in  operation  (apart  from  a 
multitude of individual applications): 
a)  Accounting  System  (CMF  - Comptabilit~  Matieres  Fissiles):  ADP 
(Automatic  Data  Processing)  and· verification  of  operator  reports. 
Reports to IAEA  on  magnetic tapes  based  on  operator's reports  but 
in a different format.  Production  of numerous  reports  for statistical 
purposes and  for assisting the accounting unit in its checks. 
b)  Seals: Automatic data processing of approximately 17000 seals/year 
from  fabrication,  issue,  placing,  '  breaking,  through  to  final 
verification. 
c)  Destructive  Analysis:  Storage  and  retrieval  of  data,  both 
administrative  and  technical,  related  to  the  taking  of  samples  for 
destructive analyses. 
d)  Inspection  planning  and  follow-up:  Input  and  storage  of  the 
scheduling of each  inspection.  Communication to IAEA of a subset 
of the  plan.  After the  inspection,  the  system  spots  (identifies)  the 
necessary follow-up actions. Chapter IV 
e)  Management:  List  of  personnel,  management  of  missions, 
productions of mission statistics, presence list etc. 
f)  MADES  (Material Accountancy Data  Evaluation System) :System to 
evaluate differences found in material balances. 
It must be  noted that for tho required confidentiality reasons (Art. 194 of the 
Treaty),  the  DCS  informatics  systems  are  physically  separated  from  tho 
Commission network. 
112. Personal computers (PC)  are an indispensable tool to assist inspectors in tho 
field as well as for purposes of headquarters evaluations. Particular attention 
is given to ensure  compatibility between tho hardware as  well as  between 
applications at tho installations.  Tho PCs  are integrated with tho main-frame 
computer through a LAN (Local Area Network). 
113. The  following  list  gives  a  survey  of  the  hardware  available  and  used 
exclusively for safeguards: 
Siemens 7560, 1.7 mips and 36 terminals and 7 hardcopy devices 
2  UNIX  computers  (Olivetti  382  and  NCR600)  for  office 
automatization including word processing etc. with 37 work stations 
120 personal computers. 
1  UNIX  computer  (NCR  600)  for  access  to  the  public  packet 
switching  data  network  (x25).  Ciphered  faxes  can  bo  transmitted 
with this network. 
2  Ciphered  faxes  to  exchange  confidential  documents  with  the 
I  A EA. 
114. Relating to software the main components are the following: 
Operating system BS2000 allowing batch and  on-line processing 
Database  management  system  ADABAS  including  query  language 
NATURAL 
Database  management  system  ORACLE  including  query  language 
SOL 
Database  management  system  dBASE  Ill  and  oracle,  for  the 
operation of the personal computers and  other software for PC's as 
WORD FOR WINDOWS, EXCEL, and others. 
11 5.  It is  expected  that the  development  of  informatics  will  proceed  in  further 
decentralising  hardware  while  maintaining  an  integrated  architecture 
permitting  strict software compatibility and,  of course,  assuring  strict data 
security. Chapter IV 
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Suoport from the Joint Research Centre fDG  XII-JRCl 
116. DG  XIJ-JRC  supports the Euratom  safeguards directorate by performing and 
financing a number of essential activities in the R&D field: 
•  Development  of  instruments,  methods  and  techniques  as  well  as 
analysis of safeguards samples: Cost about 3,5 Mia ECU  per annum. 
•  Radiation  protection  (dosimetry  and  expertise)  of  the  safeguards 
inspectors. 
•  Training  of  safeguards  personnel  at  ISPRA,  mainly  at  the  recently 
established PERLA laboratory. 
117. The support by DG  XII-JRC to the safeguards directorate is coordinated by a 
rigorous  project management. The total number of such projects amounted 
to 23 (1991) and 38 (1992). 
118. Moreover,  a  very effective  cooperation  took  place  with the  Transuranium 
Institute  (TUI)  in Karlsruhe in the framework of the follow-up of illicit trade 
and transfers of nuclear materials (see chapter VI.  below). 
119. Finally,  it  should  be  highlighted  that,  in  1992  JRC  personnel  started 
performing  missions  in  the  framework  of the  construction  of the  On  Site 
Labs (OSL). 
120. The continuation of the  support by DG  XII-JRC  to the  Euratom  Sflfeguards 
Directorate in an effective and  efficient manner is  essential. Chapter IV 
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Fig 4  Taking of Samples 
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V.  BELA TIONS WITH THE INTERNATIONAL 
A  T 0  M I C  ENE  R G Y  A  G EN C Y  (I  A E Al 
121. The  JAEA,  a  member  of  the  UN  family  of  specialised  agencies,  is  the 
international  Agency  responsible  on  a  world-wide  basis,  inter  alia,  for 
carrying  out  safeguards  under  the  Non-Proliferation  Treaty  or  other 
agreements  relating  to  tho  peaceful  use  of  nuclear  energy.  As  already 
described  above  (para.  13)  throe  Verification  Agreements  have  been 
concluded  between the Community, its Member States and the IAEA. They 
establish the responsibilities of Euratom, its Member States and the IAEA for 
the implementation of IAEA safeguards. 
122. The structure of the relations with tho IAEA may be summarised as follows: 
•  Participation  of  tho  IAEA  in  Euratom  inspections.  This  is  a  daily 
operational  task.  At  about  50 %  of  all  Euratom  inspections  IAEA 
inspectors participate. 
•  Reporting  of  tho  nuclear  material  movements  and  inventories 
pursuant  to  the  provisions  of  the  Verification  Agreements  and 
support to the IAEA system of world wide accounting for the transit 
of nuclear materials. 
•  Meetings  of  the  Liaison  Committees  pursuant  to  Art.  25  of  the 
Protocol  to  the  Safeguards  Agreements.  The  purpose  of  these 
meetings is to discuss, coordinate, negotiate general issues relating 
to IAEA safeguards in the Community. 
•  Negotiations  of  documents  of  a  technical/legal  nature  called  the 
Facility Attachments (F.A.)  or installation attachments. This requires 
a  major  negotiation  effort  on  all  sides.  Some  50  Attachments, 
including  the  attachments  for  new  installations  and  existing 
attachments in  need  of  revision,  still  need  to  be  negotiated,  about 
200 being already in force. 
•  Numerous  contacts  and  working  groups,  participation  in  seminars, 
common training activities; 
•  Collaboration  with  the  IAEA  in  the  development,  testing  and 
implementation of instruments, methods and techniques. 
123. A  number of developments took place  in  1991  and  1992 which continue to 
give rise to extended discussions and  negotiations on  the implementation of 
the three Safeguards Agreements. Chapter V 
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124. Those developments include: 
•  Duo to tho declared intent of several countries outside tho European 
Community  that  they  aim  for  tho  establishment  of  "regional" 
safeguards systems nnd  have, reportedly, indicated their objectives 
to  negotiate  for  tho  same  terms  as  Euratom  in  tho  Verification 
Agreements, tho IAEA is in a delicate position, since notably  these 
countries  in  their  current  negotiations  are  reported  to  link  their 
acceptance  of full  scope  IAEA  safeguards  with the  acceptance,  a 
priori,  of  a  regional  system.  The  political  discussion  of  "regional" 
safeguards systems is relevant  for tho  relations  between the IAEA 
and Euratom. (see below) 
•  The  JAEA  has developed a sot of "Safeguards Criteria for 1991-95" 
and  a  document  was  officially  provided  to Euratom  at the  end  of 
1990.  The Commission services undertook to analyse these criteria 
with  respect  to  safeguards  methodology,  compliance  with  tho 
Verification  Agreements  and  accompanying  understandings  (e.g .. 
Observation and  Joint Teams), compliance with facility attachments 
concluded  as  well as  with basic  Community policy such  as  on  tho 
unity of the  European  nuclear  market.  Analysis  of  tho  criteria  was 
completed in 1991. 
•  The  experience  of  Euratom  in  the  design  and  implementation  of 
safeguards systems for the  large  plutonium processing  plants show 
that their features  require  a shift from  classical  human-interference 
inspections  to  fully  automated  and  largely  unattended  systems 
leading to concepts and  approaches Euratom  considers essential to 
perform  high  quality safeguards.  As  one  of these  plants  may  be 
jointly safeguarded by Euratom and the IAEA the negotiations on the 
safeguards concepts have  led  to a consensus  on  a so-called  "base 
line approach". 
•  The New Partnership Approach (see below}. 
125. In  1991, the  above  mentioned  analysis  of the  IAEA  safeguards  criteria  for 
1991 - 95 led to a number of conclusions: 
•  The  IAEA  had  spent  an  inspection  effort  in  the  NNWS  of  the 
Community  disproportionately  high  in  comparison  with  third 
countries; 
•  No full account had been taken of the Euratom safeguards system; 
•  Certain  provisions  of  the  Verification  Agreements  would  - when 
applied  formalistically  - appear  to  impede  the  IAEA ~  for 
independent safeguards conclusions. Chapter V 
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126. In recognising these  issues the Commission and  the IAEA agreed,  in  March 
1  992  to  base  their  relations  on  a  New  Partnership  Approach  (NPA)  the 
essential features of which comprise: 
•  improving the cooperation during the planning of and  carrying out of 
inspections by making more use of tho "one man one job" system; 
•  rendering the decision making  procedures of the liaison Committee 
more effective; 
•  pooling  resources,  to  the  extent  possible,  for  inspectors  training, 
procurement  of  material,  shared  analysis,  development  of 
instruments  or,  more  generally,  to  cooperate  more  closely  in  the 
logistics field; 
•  thereby  enabling  the  IA'EA  to  reduce  its  inspection  effort  in  the 
Community. 
127. Implementation  of the  NPA  started  in  1992  for  light  water  reactors  and 
fabrication  plants  (LEU)  but  a  more  detailed  agreement  on  the  NPA  could 
only be  concluded in February  1993.  It is  expected that the NPA  could  be 
fully implemented from the end of 1994. 
128. In  essence  the  NPA  under  implementation  is  establishing  a  balanced 
compromise: 
•  On the one hand certain provisions of the Verification Agreement are 
re-interpreted; this relates notably to the principle of observation, the 
right  of  each  organisation  to  decide  on  the  activities  it needs  to 
perform  in  order  to  achieve  its  safeguards  objectives  and  to  a 
disjunction of Euratom and  IAEA tasks. 
•  On  the other hand, under the NPA,  once implemented, the IAEA will 
reduce its inspection effort in the NNWS of the Community by more 
than  50%  (compared  with  1  990)  and  this  reduction  will  be  more 
than at places where a regional safeguards system does not exist. 
129. In other words, the NPA provides for an  intensified cooperation between the 
IAEA international safeguards  system  and  the  EURATOM  system  which is, 
so  far,  the  only existing  regional  safeguards  system.  This  improvement  of 
the  Commission's  collaboration  with  the  IAEA  in  the  safeguards  field  is 
regarded  as  an  indispensable element to confirm the European  Community's 
uniquely high non-proliferation credentials. Chapter VI 
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VI.  I L L I C I  T  T R A  D £11  A  N D  T R A  N S F £ R S  0  f  N U C L E A  R 
MATERIAL 
130.  Following  the  dissolution  of  the  former  Soviet  Union  in  1991,  tho 
centralised system for nuclear materials accountancy, control and  physical 
protection  has  lost  its  grip  or  has  disappeared  entirely  in  the  various 
republics.  As far as could be  analysed by the end of 1992, in a number of 
republics  no  system  had  boon  put  in  place  which  would  perform  the 
functions of the above mentioned controls against theft of nuclear material, 
illegal  trade  of  nuclear  material  and  against  hazards  to  tho  population 
concerning contamination/radiation. 
131.  As a consequence a trickling of nuclear material i.e. uranium but also some 
plutonium,  could  be  observed  in  the  neighbouring  countries  of the  former 
Soviet Union and  also in tho European  Community.  Mechanisms observed 
wore  invariably similar since  individuals tried  to obtain and  to sell  nuclear 
material  but  also  other  radioactive  substances2> such  as  Cesium  137 and 
Strontium 90 of no relevance  as  far as  bomb fabrication is  concerned  but 
involving a significant health risk for carriers and the public. 
132.  Although no  clear indications existed  and  still  do  not exist at present,  tho 
development, however, of organised  "black markets" can not be  excluded 
and  this  is  one  of  the  reasons  why,  from  the  beginning,  tho  Euratom 
Safeguards Directorate has actively boon involved in various actions in order 
to: 
•  implement safeguards  on  nuclear material according  to Chapter VII 
of the Euratom Treaty, e.g. when necessary, by sending an inspector 
"sur place"; 
•  establish  appropriate  bilateral  contacts  and  cooperate  with 
national/local authorities and courts when a case occurred and when 
it was specifically requested by the Member State; 
•  receive  and  distribute information relating  to radioactive  substances 
and sources comprising other than nuclear material; 
•  provide  expertise,  high  precision  analysis  and  information  in  close 
cooperation with the Euratom Institute for Transuranium Elements in 
Karlsruhe when requested by Member States; 
•  sot  up  a  data  bank:  it appears  indeed  of paramount importance  to 
centralise  informntion  on  the  cases  which  occurred  in  the 
Community and  to gnther  very detailed  "fingerprint"  information to 
enable deduction of the origin of the mn_terial. 
1)  The material involved in this illicit trade has also been referred to as "vagabonding" nuclear  material or other 
radioactive substances. 
2>  Radioactive substances: any substance that contains one or more radionuuclides, the activity or the concentration 
of which cannot be disregarded as far as radiation protection is concerned (Council Directive of 15 July 1980, O.J. 
L246 of 17 September 1980). Chapter VI 
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1  33.  As  from  the  beginning,  the  European  Parliament,  National  Parliaments  of 
Member  States,  the  general  public  and  the  media  have  shown  great 
concern  in  all  problems  in  rotation  to  tho  nuclear  cycle  in  the  former 
Eastern-Block and this problem in particular. 
134.  Moreover, Member States authorities have requested (through the Council's 
Atomic  Questions  Group),  that this  problem  be  dealt with at Community 
level. 
135.  It may be  recalled  that the  Commission has initiated programmes, namely 
PHARE  and  TACIS,  to  stop,  nter  alia,  further  deterior:ation  and  improve 
nuclear safety of the eastern nuclear installations and to contribute to bring 
their safety standards to a level  equivalent to tho  western standards.  In 
order to contribute  also to tho prevention of a further deterioration of the 
accounting  and  control  of  nuclear  material  in  CIS  and  PECO,  specific 
actions  outside  of  and  in  addition  to  PHARE  and  TACIS  in  tho  field  of 
nuclear  safeguards  and,  later,  radiation  protection  have  boon  initiated  in 
1992  between  Commission  services  and  authorities  in  tho  Russian 
Federation  (see  Chapter VII).  By  developing such actions, the Community 
will contribute to ensure that illicit trade of nuclear and radioactive materials 
is reduced and, if possible, eliminated at medium term. 
136.  In the Community,  there were 14 cases known by the end  of 1992 by the 
Euratom  Safeguards  Directorate  which  involved  uranium  and/or  plutonium 
and in which to a variable degree the Commission Services cooperated with 
the Member State's Authorities concerned.  In a few other cases,  Euratom 
Safeguards  Directorate's  services  wero·  put  ln  "State  of  Alert"  but 
fortunately nothing happened.  Outside the European  Community a number 
of  cases  were  reportedly  discovered  in  neighbouring  countries  such  as 
Switzerland and  Austria  of which the Euratom Safeguards Directorate was 
informed. 
137. In the period  under consideration (1991-1992), a number of cases occurred 
involving  other  radioactive  substances,  not  submitted  to  safeguards.  The 
number probably exceeds  100.  The  cases which involved plutonium and/or 
uranium  were  only identified  in  Germany and  Italy since  illicit traders  from 
the  east apparently crossed  the  Community borders  by  entering  into these 
countries.  For  each  case  which appeared. in  Italy there  were contacts with 
Italian authorities.  In  Germany, contacts involved Federal  authorities, Uinder 
authorities and  criminal courts.  Through an  exchange of letters between the 
Permanent  representation  of  Germany  to  the  European  Communities  and 
Commission's  Directorate  General  for  Energy  the  structure  relating  to 
communication, coordination and  analyses was established and worked well 
in all the subsequent cases. 
138. Based  on  the  experience  gained  in  1992 the  Council's  Atomic  Questions 
Group  requested  that  the  relevant  actions  be  coordinated  on  Community 
level  in  due  recognition  of the  fact  that  the  problem  is  an  European  one. 
These efforts started in  1993. · Chapter VII 
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VII.  COOPERATION  WITH  THE  REPUBLICS  OF 
COMMONWEALTH  OF  INDEPENDENT  STATES 
EASTERN  EUROPEAN  COUNTRIES  IN 
SAEEGUARDS  EIELD 
THE 
AND 
THE 
139. Concerning  tho  European  Community's  programmes  TACIS  and  PHARE, 
reference is made to paragraph 135 abo've. 
140. In tho field of NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS two issues in the context of CIS  and 
Eastern Europe had to be distinguished: 
(a)  Safeguarding  the  disarmament  of  nuclear  weapons  including  tho 
dismantling of nuclear warheads, storage and  further civil use of tho 
contained nuclear material; 
(b)  Safeguards  on  the  civil  nuclear  materials  and  related  physical 
protection. 
141 . As mentioned in Chapter VI of this Report, a trickle of nuclear materials has 
been  observed from CIS  territories to Western Europe  through black market 
channels.  The  appearance  of  these  "vagabonding"  nuclear materials  (since 
late  1991)  had  to  be  interpreted  as  a  further  indication  of  a  possible 
disintegrating or slackening of the safeguards and control systems in CIS. 
142. Mel""~er States  of  the  EC,  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Commission 
realised that further and  immediate efforts were required to collaborate with 
CIS  republics and, as  appropriate, with other Eastern European countries. 
143. For  such  cooperation  and  support  activities  in  the  safeguards  field  tho 
general objectives included : 
•  to contribute  to the  improvement  of  the  accountancy  and  control 
system  in  CIS  republics  to  the  standards  of  nuclear  material 
accountancy and  control  maintained  in  other countries  - as,  e.g.  in 
the European Community - having substantial nuclear programmes; 
•  to contribute that such  systems would comply with the safeguards 
requirements of the International Atomic Energy Agency UAEA) and, 
•  thereby  to  contribute  to  the  Non-Proliferation  of  nuclear  materials 
and  to  the  minimisation  of  hazards  to  the  public  through 
vagabonding materials. 
144. In  early Autumn  1992 a dialogue  started with representatives  of tho  CIS, 
including  a  meeting  at the  higher level  during  the  IAEA  General  Conference 
to  explore  whether  such  support  and  cooperation  would  be  welcome  and 
requested. Chaptor VII 
145. During  the  discussion  of  the  budget  of  the  Communities  en  1992,  the 
European Parliament decided to make funds available under a special budget 
line  8.4.2001  already  for  1993  for  tho  assistance  to  CIS  and  PECO  in 
safeguards. 
146. Thereafter the Euratom Safeguards Directorate undertook a conceptual study 
to identify inter alia: 
•  The reason for and  objectives of a then future cooperation with CIS 
and PECO in the safeguards field. 
•  Possible short term (1993) approaches, plans and programmes. 
•  Medium term (1994) plans and programmes. 
14  7. In essence the study concluded and  suggested : 
•  To initiate an intensive dialogue with representatives of the Russian 
Federation (RF); 
•  To  avoid  duplication  of  activities,  i.e.,  to  ensure  that  the  actions 
performed are  complementary to the actions of others programmes 
but to liaise with 
- Member States 
- Operators of nuclear installations, research centres and  experts 
-the IAEA 
-Third countries, as appropriate; 
•  To hold initial. seminars (in Luxembourg) in order to  identify: 
Competent interlocutors  • 
The needs in the safeguards areas 
Possibilities  for  evaluating  the  effectiveness  of  the 
cooperation; 
•  To cooperate  with the  medium  term  objective  to contribute  to the 
establishment  of  a  high-quality  nuclear  material  accounting  and 
control system in the RF  on  the level  of installations, districts and at 
central control authorities 
The  concept  was  submitted  in  March  1993  for  consideration  at 
Commissioner level ; the necessary consent was obtained . Chapter VII 
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148. Although tho action was really started after the period under consideration, it 
is considered useful to report on tho ongoing and  planned actions as well as 
on results obtained, viz: 
•  The first seminm took place  from 3  to 5  May 1993 in Luxembourg 
comprising  14 participants from  RF  and  Commission  services.  The 
following items wore discussed and consensus was roached : 
organisational issues such as on the establishment of a Joint 
Coordination Group (JCG); 
a short torm programme consisting of tho organisation of 
workshop seminars  in Luxembourg and in tho RF (Russian 
Federation}; 
tho design, testing and the implementation of a Nuclear 
material Accountancy and Control (NMAC) System at state 
level; 
a medium -term programme defining the main directions for 
tho cooperation between Euratom and the RF for the period 
1994 to 1996; 
information exchange. 
•  The  second  seminar  took  place  from  9  to  12  Juno  1993  in 
Luxembourg  comprising  some  35  participants  from  tho  RF 
(Gosatomnadzor, Minatom, Kurtchatev Institute and plant operators), 
from tho Commission services and Community nuclear industry.  The 
results  of  and  conclusions  from  the  seminar  - 1  0  lectures  and 
discussions  on  accountancy  and  control  systems  plus 
demonstrations  of  safeguards  equipment  - and  the  subsequent 
meeting  of the  Joint Coordination Group  were that consensus  was 
reached on all issues, including : 
observations on tho usefulness of the seminar and lesson 
learnt; 
composition of the Joint Coordination Group; 
the short-term programme (1993): 
a)  Provisions/exchange of information on the overall 
architecture, components etc. of the (computerised) 
nuclear materials and control system (NMAC); 
b)  Three further seminars specifically on NMAC 
architecture, design and implementation; 
c)  Three working parties of 2 experts each from RF  on 
NMAC to stay in Luxembourg to carry out the work 
described under b)  above. 
The medium term programme (see  below) 
•  The following medium programme of activities has been agreed : 
a)  the seminars and working parties as described  above 
during the 2nd semester of 1993; 
b)  In March 1994:  review and appraisal of the work 
performed by the working 
parties.  · -53-
c)  In April 1994 : 
Chapter VII 
Seminar in RF for 60-80 
participants to train facility 
operators and national 
inspectors; 
d)  During 1994 (2 seminars - deadlines and further 
details will be established in September 1993): 
Further design, test and implementation of a 
computerised information system for NMAC in the RF; 
e)  During 1994 and  1995: 
Technical support to the NMAC (for operators and 
inspectors) 
- Methodology 
- Hardware and software 
- Instrumentation for measurements and control 
containment and surveillance equipment. 
(All on a demonstration basis). 
149. The following conclusions may already be drawn: 
a)  The  concepts  for  the  cooperation  with,  initially  the  Russian 
Federation have been developed; 
b)  The cooperation with relevant Russian  authorities and  operators has 
been initiated and will be  of a very concrete nature; 
c)  Several  seminars  with  wide  participation  from  RF,  Community 
operators and  Commission services were held in  Luxembourg; 
d)  The  organisational  set-up  as  well as  the programmes  for  1993 and 
1994 were agreed; 
e)  The  practical  work,  other  than  of  a  programmatic  nature,  will 
continue  with the objective to contribute to the design, testing and 
implementation  of  a  high-quality  nuclear  materials  accountancy 
system in the Russian Federation; 
f)  The  plans  for  the  training  of  and  technical  support  to  facility 
operators and national inspectors have been established. 
1  50. While it is considered also in the interest of the  Community that the nuclear 
material  in  the  CIS  is  well  under  control  against  misuse  (e.g.  Proliferation, 
vagabonding  materials)  - it is  still  too  early  for  a  realistic  assessment  on 
whether  or  not ·this  cooperation  between  EURATOM  and  the  Russian 
Federation in the field of safeguards will have the envisaged impact.  Such a 
realistic  assessment  should  be  possible  in  1994  when  the  first  products 
resulting  from  the  cooperation  are  planned  to  be  tested  and,  hopefully, 
implemented at nuclear facilities and control authorities. Chapter VIII 
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VIII.  T R EN 0  S  IN S A FE G U A B 0  S 
151. Safeguards  up to  1996 can  be  characterised  through the  way it will cope 
with tho increased  availability and  use  of plutonium in the  commercial  fuel 
cycle of the Community, through tho desirability to continuo to improve the 
effectiveness  and  efficiency  of  tho  safeguards  operation  in  general  and 
through  the  contributions  to  be  made  to  the  adhesion  of .  now  member 
countries  to tho  Community,  to  the  negotiations  for  and  conclusions  of  a· 
now  nuclear  cooperation  agreement  with  tho  United  States,  to  the 
cooperation and support to CIS  and PECO  and, last but not least, through tho 
contributions to tho Non Proliferation regime. 
152. As  far  as  the  Euratom  safeguards  operation  "stricto sensu"  is  concerned, 
reference  is made  in this respect to tho  trends  as  described  in  paragraphs 
101  to 106 of the Operations Report for 1988 as  well as  to paragraphs  23 
to 34 of tho present report. 
153. From  a technical point of view, the  trend reported in paragraph  106 of tho 
"1988  Report"  can  be  confirmed  as  presenting  a  continuing  challenge  to 
safeguards in two respects. 
•  For  security and  health  physics  reasons,  installations  are  designed 
and  operated,  where  the  nuclear  material  which  is  subject  to 
safeguards is more and  more inaccessible (massive transport/storage 
containers not designed for routine opening; heavily shielded, secure 
storage  of  sensitive  nuclear  material).  Developments  now  being 
applied  include  advanced  measurement  instrumentation  and 
sophisticated  C/S  systems  including  monitoring/logging  systems 
designed to react to and record events which might be  of interest to 
safeguards. These  developments will need  to be  continued to keep 
pace  with design  changes  and  adapted  to specific  situations.  For 
example,  a  new  type  of  installation  is  presently  under  design  and 
may enter pilot plant stage, i.e.  plants to "compact" irradiated  LWR 
fuel elements for the purpose of later "final" disposal.  It is expected 
that  such  pilot  plants  might  become  operational  between  1995-
2000;  relevant  safeguards  concepts  and  approaches  are  presently 
being discussed with operators and with the IAEA. 
•  The main fuel cycle facilities, f!e.  fabrication and reprocessing plants 
are  developed  to  operate  in  a  fully  automated  (and  remotely 
controlled) mode.  This trend continues to cause the departure from 
established  safeguards/inspection  practice,  i.e.  the  need  for 
Euratom: 
to continue with the involvement of safeguards experts in  the 
design/construction  work  at  a  stage  long  before 
commissioning; Chapter VIII 
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to  increase  further  the  emphasis  on  the  act1v1t1es  related  to 
authentication  for  safeguards  purposes  of  plant  design, 
operators measurement procedures and  accounting; 
to  increase  further  the  importance  of  verification  and  re-
verification of the basic technical characteristics; 
',I'  ' 
to continue in  safeguards operations to try to  limit the need 
for additional manpower, in line  with the manpower provisions 
made  by  the  Commission  (ref.  para.  91 ),  through  the 
development  and  implementation  of  automated,  largely 
unattended measurement systems where feasible. 
154. In  1995  the  accession  to  the  Community  of  four  new  Member  States  is 
envisaged, two of which maintain considerable nuclear programmes.  Based 
on the 1986 precedent of the accession of Spain and  Portugal as  well as  the 
1990 German unification, considerable safeguards effort is expected to have 
to be  spent in order to: 
•  Ensure that the provisions of the Euratom Treaty be fully respected. 
•  Establish,  by appropriate safeguards measures that the  declarations 
of the operators are  fully consistent with the physical reality of the 
flows  and  inventories  of the  nuclear  materials  under  safeguards  at 
the installations. 
•  Integrate  the  new  member  countries  and  the  corresponding 
installations  into. the  EURATOM-IAEA  collaboration  in  saf'3guards 
under the (NNWS) Verification agreement. 
154.b It is  expected that a new agreement between Euratom  and  the  US-DOE  in 
the field of nuclear safeguards research and  development will  be  signed in  a 
near future.  its objective is the cooperation in mutually agreed  research and 
development topics and  the  training  of nuclear  inspectors and  specialists in 
order to enhance the effectiveness of nuclear fuel safeguards. 
155. The  safeguards contribution to the negotiation  for  and  conclusion  of a new 
cooperation  agreement  with  the  United  States  is  a  particularly  challenging 
task.· This  new  agreement  needs  to  be  a  fair  agreement  between  equal 
partners. The agreement should not strengthen bilateral  controls  and extend 
national  legislation  unilaterally  to  international  agreements  as  this  would 
adversely effect the  Community interests  and  would  be  detrimental  to  the 
strengthening of the international non-proliferation regime. 
156. Concerning  the  cooperation  with  and  support  to  CIS  and  PECO  in  the 
safeguards field (Please  refer to Chapter VII of the report) it is expected that 
these  activities  will  require  a dramatically increasing  attention  and  effort of 
DCS  due to the extreme political importance of both the safeguarding of the 
nuclear  materials  transferred  from  the  weapons  programmes  to  the  civil 
cycle as  well as  of the basic safeguarding of the nuclear installations in these 
countries.  " Chapter VIII 
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1 57. The  strengthening  of the  international  non  - proliferation  regime  requires  a 
contribution from the Euratom Safeguards Directorate in two aspects: 
a)  To  participate  in  the  deliberations to implement Community policy, 
i.e.  to  have  tho  Non  Proliferation  Treaty  extended  in  1995 
unconditionally. 
b)  To implement certain measures intended to strengthen international 
(IAEA)  safeguards.  Those  measures include the implementation of 
or contributions to the universal reporting, environmental monitoring 
and  sampling  techniques,  early  design  information  and  other 
measures. Chapter IX 
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IX.  SUMMARY 
158. The  effectiveness of Euratom  safeguards  operation  depends  as  outlined  in 
this report  on  the manner in  which tho inspection service  is  organised  and 
motivated,  on  the  promptness  and  the  extent  to  which  operators  and 
Member  State  authorities  fulfil  their  responsibilities  and  on  the  resources 
made available to the Commission. 
159. Relating to the mandate, tho intensity and depth of Euratom safeguards, the 
Commission has been entrusted with extensive responsibilities. However, the 
budgetary and manpower appropriations made available largely determine the 
discharge of these responsibilities as  well as  the ability to make progress in 
the way indicated in this report. 
160. As  the  use  of  recycled  plutonium  has  now  reached  routine  commercial 
application,  Euratom  safeguards  continues to give the  necessary  priority to 
the control of the large plutonium fuel cycle facilities.  The necessary human 
and  financial  resources  have  been  determined  for those  plants and  need  to 
be  available and made operational. · 
161. Tho  tasks  of  Euratom  safeguards  continuo  further  to  increase  within  and 
beyond  the scope  provided  for in  the  Treaty.  This  relates,  notably, to the 
contributions as a regional safeguards system to world wide non-proliferation 
safeguards,  to the  negotiations  of a  new cooperation  agreement  with the 
United States and  to the cooperation with and  support to the states of the 
former Soviet Union in the safeguards field. AGR 
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ANNEX 1 
EURATOM SAFEGUARD~ 
Glossprv of abbreviations currently used in Safeguards 
Advanced Gaz-coolod Reactor 
Atomic Energy Control Board (Canada) 
Atomic Energy Research Establishment (Harwell) 
Agence lnternationale do I'Enorgie Atomique (see IAEA) 
Atomic Questions Group (see GOA)  · 
Actual Routine Inspection Effort (for Euratom) 
Actual Routine lnspe.ction Effort (for IAEA) 
Australian Safeguards Office 
· Activo Well Coincidence Counter 
Bureau Central do Mesuros Nucl~aires (see  CBNM) 
(Gaol  Belgium) 
Bulk Handling Facility 
Bundosministerium fUr Forschung und Technologie 
Brith Nuclear Fuels pic 
Brookhaven Stablized Assay Meter 
Basic Technical Characteristics (see  CTF) 
Boiling Water Reactor 
Catch-all MBA (=Very small installations) 
Control Bureau for Nuclear Measurements (Geol  Belgium) 
Commission Consultative des Achats at de  Marches 
Centro Commun de  Recherche (see JRC) 
Closed Circuit Television 
Commissariat & I'Energio Atomique 
Comit6 Enorgie, Recherche et Technologie du P.E. 
Comptabilite Matieres Fissiles 
Cooperation Politique 
Comit6 des Representants Permanents 
=  COREPER 
Containment and Surveillance 
Communication to Council 
Caracteristiques Techniques Fondamentalos (see  BTC) 
Comite Technique lnterministeriel pour !'Euratom 
Cerenkov Viewing Device 
Destructive Analysis (see  also NDA) 
Direction Controle de Securite (see  ESD) 
Director General Meeting 
Design Information 
Department of Energy (UK) 
Dispositions Particulieres do  ContrOie (see  PSP) 
Determination of Uranium 235 Content Apparatus 
European Commission Safeguards Analytical Measurement Committee 
. Etat dote d'Armements Nucleaires (see NWS) 
Electricite de France 
Effective Kilogram 
Etat Non-Dote d'Armements Nucleaires (see NNWS) ENEA 
EP 
ESA 
ESARDA. 
ESD 
ESP 
EUR 
FA 
FANT 
FBOM 
FBR 
GFK 
GOA 
HEU 
HLLC 
HLNCC 
HSP 
IAEA 
I  AEO 
ICR 
ICT 
IMD 
IMS 
INMM 
IPSN 
ISM 
JRC 
JT 
JTWG 
KFA 
KMP 
LASL 
LEMUF 
LEU 
LFUA 
Lll 
LOI 
LLLC 
LOF 
LOVER 
LWR 
MBA 
MBP 
MBR 
MD 
MDC 
MEB 
MIS 
MOX 
MTR 
MUF 
Comitate Nazionalo per I'Energia Nucleare e I'Energia Alternative 
European Parliament 
Euratom Supply Agency (see SA) 
European Safeguards Research and Development Association 
Euratorri Safeguards Directorate (see DCS) 
Etat des Stocks Physiques (see PIL) 
Euratom 
Facility Attachment 
Facility Attachments Negotiating Teams 
Follow-up and Balancing Of Mixes 
Fast Breeder Reactor 
Gesellschaft fOr Kernforschung mbh (Knrlsruhe) 
Groupe des Questions Atomiques (see AOG) 
Highly Enriched Uranium 
High Level Liaison Committee (Art. 25 Protocol VA) 
High Level Neutron Coincidence Counter 
Hexapartite Safeguards Project 
International Atomic Energy Agency (see AIEA) 
lnternationale Atomenergie-Organisation (see IAEA) 
Inventory Change Report (see RVS) 
Isotopic Correlation Technique 
Inspector Mission Day 
Integrated Monitoring System 
Institute of Nuclear Materials Management (USA) 
lnstitut de Protection et de  SOret~ Nucl~aire, Fontonay-aux-Roses 
- Inter-Service Meeting 
- Informatics Systems Manager 
Joint Research Centre (see  CCR) 
Joint Team 
Joint Technical Working Group 
Kernforschungsanlage Julich 
Key Measurement Point (see PMP) 
Los Alamos Scientific Lab (USA) 
Limits of Error of MUF 
Low Enriched Uranium 
Limited Frequency Unannounced Access 
List of Inventory Items (see  LOI) 
Liste des Objets on  lnvontaire (see Lll 
Lower Level Liaison Committee (Art. 25 Protocol VA) 
Location Outside Facility (Holding less than 1 eKg) 
LOcal VERification 
Light Water Reactor 
Material Balance Area (see ZBM) 
Material Balance Period 
Material Balance Report (see  RBM) 
Man-day(s) 
Material Description Code 
Multi Element Bottle 
Management Information System 
Mixed Oxide 
Material Testing Reactor 
Material unaccounted For NCC 
NDA 
NM 
NMACT 
NMTR 
NNPA 
NNWS 
NPA 
NPT 
NRTA 
NUMSAS 
NVD 
NWS 
OJOM 
OTTO (list) 
PE 
PICF 
PIL 
PIT 
PIV 
PMP 
PSEP 
PSP 
PSU 
PWR 
RBM. 
RCD 
R&D 
RFS 
RM 
RMS 
RRCS 
RVS. 
SA 
SAGS I 
SAM 
SEAM 
SGHWR 
SIC 
SICDB 
SIR 
SMS 
SOM 
SP 
SPI 
sa 
SRD 
SSAC 
THTR 
TLD 
TNP 
TO  (list) 
UFBR 
UKAEA 
VA 
Neutron Coincidence Collar 
Non Destructive Analysis (see also DA) 
Nuclear Material 
Nuclear Material Accounting Control Team (UK) 
Nuclear Material Transfort Report 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act 
Non-Nuclear Weapon State (see ENDAN) 
Now Partnership Approach 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (see TNP) 
Near Real Time Accountancy 
Nuclear Material Statistical Accountancy System 
Night Vision Device 
Nuclear Weapon State (see  EDAN) 
One Job-One Man 
Other Than Through Observation 
Parlement Europ~en (see  EP) 
Physical Inventory Control and Follow-up 
Physical Inventory Listing 
Physical Inventory Taking 
Physical Inventory Verification 
Point do Mesure Principal (see KMP) 
Particular Safeguards Evaluation Procedures 
Particulnr Safeguards Provisions (see  DPC) 
Portable Surveillance Unit 
Pressurized Water Reactor 
Rapport de Bilan Matieres (see MBR) 
R~union des Chefs de  Division 
Research and Development 
Rapid Feedback System 
Reference Material 
Resource Management System 
Rapport sur les  R~alisations du ContrOls de  S~curit~ 
Rapport do Variation de Stocks (see  ICR) 
-Supply Agency (see  EAS) 
-Subsidiary Arrangements 
Standing Advisory Group for Safeguards Implementation 
Stabilized Assay Meter 
Safeguards Effectiveness Assessment Methodology 
Steam Generating Heavy Water Reactor 
Summary Inventory Changes 
Safeguards Information centre Data Base  (ADABAS data base) 
Safeguards Implementation Report (IAEA) 
Safeguards Management System 
Senior Officers Meeting 
Strategic Point 
Summary Physical Inventory 
Significant Quantity 
Shipper/Receiver Difference 
State System of Accountancy and Control 
Thorium Hochtemperatur Reaktor 
Thermoluminescence Dosimetry 
Trait~ de  Non-Prolif~ration (see  NPT) 
Through Observation (see  also OTTO) 
Universal Fast Breeder Reactor Counter 
United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority 
Verification Agreement(s) 
-~ VDC 
WGAR 
WGGC 
WPDE 
WPIA 
WPIP 
WPIT 
WPSA 
WWTP 
ZBM 
Variable Dead-time Counter 
Working Group on Accountancy and Reporting 
Working Group on inspection Goals and acceptance Criteria 
Working Party on Data Evnluation 
Working Party on Informatics and Accountancy 
Working Party on Planning of Inspections 
Working Party on Instruments and Techniques 
Working Party on Safeguards Approaches 
Working Party on Working conditions, Training and Procedures 
Zone de  Bilan Matillro (see MBA) 
_(/J. CHAPTER  VII 
SAFEGUARDS 
A  rticl~  77 
In  Jccordance  with  the  prov•s•ons  of  this  Chapter,  the  Com-
mission  shall  satisfy  itself  that,  in  the  territories of Member States, 
(a)  ores,  source  materials  and  special  fissile  materials  are  not 
diverted  from  their intended  uses  as  declared  by  the  users; 
(b)  the  provJsJons  relating  to  supply  and  any  particular  safe-
guarding  obligations  assumed  by  the  Community  under  an  agree-
ment  concluded  with  a  third  State or an  international  organisation 
are complied with. 
Article  78 
Anyone  setting  up or operating  an  installation  for  the  produc-
tion,  separation  or other  use  of source  materials  or special  fissile 
materials  or  for  the  processing  of  irradiated  nuclear  fuels  shall 
~ 
r"' 
decl an:  to  the  Commission  the  basic  technical  char!!cleristics  of 
the installations, to the extent that knowledge of the~ char!!cterutics 
is  necessary for the attainment of the objectives set out in Article 77. 
The Commission must approve the techniques to be used for the 
chemical  processing  of  irradiated  materials,  to  the  extent  necess-
Jry  to attain  the ob,  ~ctives  s~t out in  Article 77. 
A  rlic/~  79 
The  Commission  shall  require  that  operating  records  be  kept 
and  produced  in  order  to  permit  accounting  !or  ores,  source 
materials  and special  fissile  materials used or produced. The aame 
requirement  shall  apply  in  the  case  of  the  transport  of  source 
materials  and  special  fissile  materials. 
Those subject  to  such  requirements  shall  notify  the  authorities 
of the  Member State concerned of any communications they make 
to the Commission pursuant to Article 78 and to the first  paragraph 
of this Article. 
The  nature  and  the  extent  of  the  req~irements referred  to  in 
the  first  paragraph of this  Article  shall  be  defined  in  a  regulation 
made  by  the  Commission  and  approved  by  the  Council, 
Article 80 
The  Commission  may  require  that  any  excess  special  fissile 
materials  recovered  or  obtained  as  by-products  and  not  actually 
being  used  or ready  for use  shall  be  deposited  with the Agency or 
in other stores which  are or can be supervised by the Commission. 
Special  fissile  materials  deposited  in this  way must be  returned 
forthwith  to  those  concerned  at  their request. 
ANNEX  2 
Article 81 
The  Commission  may  send  inspectors  into  the  territories  of 
Member States. Before sending an inspector on his first assignment 
in  the  territory  of a  Member State,  the  Commission  shall  consul! 
the  State  concerned;  such  consult~tion  shall  suffice  to  cover  Rli 
future assignments of this inspector. 
On  presentation of a  document  cstab!i.shing  their  authority,  in-
spectors shall at all  times have access to  :~II  places  and data and  tn 
all  persons who, by reason of their occupation, deal with materials, 
equipment  or  installations  subject  to  the  safeguards  provided  for 
in  this  Chapter,  to  the  extent  necessary: in  order  to  apply  such 
safeguards to ores, source materials and special fissile  materials and 
to ensure compliance  with the provisions df  Article 77.  Should  the 
State  concerned  so  request,  inspectors  appointed  by  the  Commis· 
sion  shall  be  accompJnied  by  representatives  of the  authorities  of 
that State; however,  the  inspectors shall  not  thereby  be  delayed  or 
otherwise  impeded in  the  performance of their duties. 
If the carrying out of an  inspection is  opposed, the  Commission 
shall  apply  to  the  President of the  Court of Justice  for  an  order 
to  ensure  that  the  inspection  be  carried  out  compulsorily.  The 
President of the Court of Justice shall  give  a  decision within three 
days. 
If  there  is  danger  in  delay,  the  Commission  may  itself  issue 
a  written  order,  in  the  form  of  a  decision,  to  proceed  with  the 
inspection. This order shall be submitted without delay to the Presi· 
dent  of the  Court of Justice  for  subsequ~nt approval. 
After the  order or decision  has  been  issued,  the  authurilies  uf 
the  State  concerned  shall  ensure  that  the  inspectors  have  acce~s 
to  the  place-s  specified  in  the order or decision. Arlie/~ 82 
Inspectors shall  be  recruited  by  the  Commission. 
They shall be  responsible for obtaining and verifying the records 
referred  to  in  Article  79.  They  shall  report  any  infringement  to 
the  Commi!sion. 
The Commission may issue  a  directive calling upon the Member 
State concerned to take, by  a  time limit set by  the Commission, all 
measures  necessary  to  bring  such  infringement  to  an  end;  it  shall 
inform the Council thereof. 
I( the  Member  State  does  not  comply  with  the  Commission 
directive  by  the  time  limit  set,  the  Commission  or  any  Memher 
State  concerned  may,  in  derogation  from  Articles  141  and  142, 
refer the  matter  to  the  Court of Justice  direct. 
Article 83 
1.  In the event of an infringement on the part of persons or under-
takings  of the  obligations  imposed  on  them  by  this  Chapter,  the 
Commiuion may impose sanctions on such persons or undertakings. 
The~e sanctions  shall  be,  in  order of severity: 
(a)  a warning; 
(b)  the withdrawal of special  benefits such  as  financial or tech-
nical  assistance; 
(c)  the placing of the undertaking for a period not exceeding four 
. months  under  the  administration of  a  person  or  board  appointed 
by  common accord of the  Commission and the State  having juris-
diction  over  thr  undertaking; 
(d)  total  or  partial  withdrawal  of  source  materials  or  special 
fissile  materials. 
2.  Decisions  taken  by  the  Commission  in  implementation of para-
graph  1 and  requiring  the  surrender of materials  shall  be  enforce-
b 
able.  They  may  be  enforced in the  territories of Member States  in 
accordance  with  Article  164. 
By  way of derogation from Article  157, appeals brought before 
the  Court  of  Justice  against  decisions  of  the  Commission  which 
impose any of the sanctions provided for in paragraph 1 shall have 
suspensory  effect.  The  Court  of Justice  may,  however,  on  appli-
cation  by  the  Commission  or  by  any  Member  State  concerned, 
order that the decision be enforced forthwith. 
There  shall  be  an  appropriate  legal  procedure  to  ensure  the 
protection  of .interests  that  ha~e been  prejudiced. 
3.  The Commission  may  make  any  recommendations  to  Member 
States concerning  laws  or regulations which an: designed  to  ensure 
compliance  in  their  territories  with  the  obligations  arising  under 
this  Chapter. 
4.  Member  StJtes  shJll  ensure  that  sanctions  are  epforced  and, 
where  necessary,  that  the  infringements  are  remedied  by  those 
committing  them. 
Article 84 
In  the  application  of  the  safeguards,  no  discrimination  shall 
be  made on  grounds  of the  use  for which  ores,  source  materials 
and special fissile  materials are intended. 
The scope of and procedure for the safeguards  and the  powers 
of  the  bodies  responsible  for  their· application  shall  be  confined 
to  the attainment of the objectives set  out in thi! Chapter. 
The  Safeguards  may  not extend  to  materials  intended  to  meet 
defence  requirements  which  are  in  the  course  of  being  specially 
processed for this  purpose  or which,  after being so  processed,  nr 
in  accordance  with  an  operational  plan,  placed  or  stored  in 
military  establishment.  · 
A.rlicle  85 
Where cew circumstances so require, the procedures for applyir 
the  safeguards laid down  io  this  Chapter. may,  at the request  of 
Member State  or of the Com:niss:on,  be. adapted  by  the  Counci 
acti.llg  unani."nously  on a  proposal  from  llle  Commission  and  a!tc 
consulting the Al!embly. The Comrnis!ion shall  examine  aoy  sue 
request  made by  a  Member State. 